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Hause aufgelegten Veröffentlichungsreihe „Statistik und Wissenschaft“. Mit dieser 
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Wissenschaftlich hervorragende Nachwuchsarbeiten, die mit dem Gerhard-Fürst-Preis 
des Statistischen Bundesamtes ausgezeichnet wurden, können in dieser Reihe veröf-
fentlicht werden. 
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The Contribution of Strategic Voting to the Field of Electoral Behavior
Chapter 1
The Contribution of Strategic Voting to the Field of
Electoral Behavior
It appeared obvious even to the staunchest supporters of Ralph Nader, the Green Party
candidate in the 2000 U.S. Presidential race, that their candidate could not get elected
President. This prospect notwithstanding some voted for him anyway in order to show
their support. While it is probably not a strong assumption that many Nader supporters
preferred a President Gore to a President Bush, these supporters, however, could also have
deserted Nader and instead cast a strategic vote for Gore. Particularly in close races -
as was the case in many Midwestern states and in Florida - the strategy to support the
\lesser of the two evils" might have been very inuential. In this scenario, strategic voters
could have changed the distribution of delegates in the Electoral College: A \Bush state"
could ip over into the Gore \column" or alternately, if enough Nader supporter had been
able to coordinate their voting behavior to prevent the election of a President Bush (i.e.,
by systematically deserting their own truly preferred candidate and instead casting a vote
for Gore), these voters might have helped Gore maintain his lead in a particular state.1
Apparently, there are good reasons not to vote for one's favored candidate. Nevertheless,
does this not contradict the basic tenet of theories in electoral behavior?
The most compelling theories about electoral behavior try to explain how a voter makes up
her mind, why she perceives candidates and parties in certain ways, what impact underlying
values have on the structure of her belief system and on the salience of various campaign
issues on her decision to vote. That said, competing models of electoral behavior focus on
certain aspects, invariably emphasizing dierent factors at the expense of others.
Some scholars, for example, develop theories on the individual level, using experimental
or survey methodology to try to test theories of what is \going on" in a voter's mind.
1) Similar to \log-rolling" on the elite level, some voters tried to coordinate their vote choices. AsTHE
NEW YORK TIMES reported on Tuesday, October 31, page A20, some Internet sites provided the
means to \swap" or even \trade" votes.
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Generally, the status of these theories is in a much better position today than were its
cruder predecessors a half-century ago. Theories today improve on older ones by identi-
fying conditions under which we can predict deviations from previously expected behavior.
Undoubtedly, there have been great theoretical strides in this eld. Critics, however, still
question whether and how these new insights into the reasoning and behavior of voters
substantively matter for an election. Where is the \public" in public opinion?
At the aggregate level of analysis, other scholars have developed macro-theories that focus
on electoral outcomes, or the output side, of the political system in general. Informed by
insights stemming from the individual level, these scholars try to develop theories on the
macro level using aggregate data to test their hypotheses. This research strategy is by no
means uncontested either. The picture drawn by macro theories of a particular voter is
questioned because it is oftentimes inconsistent with evidence from individual-level studies.
Where is the \voter" in voting behavior?, one might ask.
Both sides remain in healthy competition with each other - and indeed, more symbiotically,
inform one another intellectually. Furthermore, despite their fundamental dierences, how-
ever, these models share an overarching assumption that, once a voter makes up her mind,
she will invariably proceed to vote for her most preferred candidate. As the Nader example
illustrates, however, this premise is not always tenable.
It is within this framework that the strategic voting phenomenon makes its contribution
to understanding electoral behavior. Studies of strategic voting specify conditions under
which a voter does not vote for her most preferred candidate or party. Instead, according
to certain chains of reasoning, or what is called a \strategy", the voter casts her vote for
another candidate or party in a way that by all appearances would seem to be counter-
intuitive to her true preferences. Studies of strategic voting focus on electoral institutions
and the public's perception of who is likely to win in an election, in order to determine
the range of factors voters might consider in their voting calculus. These factors have not
been considered before.
Most studies of strategic voting refer to the UK and some to the U.S. In terms of the
range of electoral institutions covered, the focus of these studies is quite narrow. This
narrowness is somewhat surprising, given the central importance of electoral institutions
in this literature. These studies are based on essentially one set of electoral institutions:
those found in the single-member district plurality system. There is less concern in this
literature with how other electoral systems induce strategic behavior. It seems entirely
reasonable that strategic voting should be observable in many other electoral systems as
well. In my dissertation, I take a step out of the narrow focus of the current state of
the strategic voting literature, and study the incentives that motivate strategic behavior
outside the universe of single-member district plurality systems.
What sort of impact does the nature of a party system, or of electoral institutions, have
on voters at the polls? In a system with only two parties or candidates, possible incentives
not to vote for the preferred party or candidate are not very powerful. In this type of
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political landscape, it might be that a voter simply abstains if she dislikes both choices.
Having at least three choices, on the other hand, some voters might indeed settle for a
\lesser evil" so as to prevent a worse outcome (i.e., their least preferred candidate winning
the election) if their preferred choice is perceived to be without a chance of winning.
In a multiparty system, the perception of who is going to win an election is arguably
more ambiguous than in a two-party system, especially in systems with certain electoral
institutions. Parliamentary systems with proportional representation, for instance, always
have numerous parties competing in elections. Normally, therefore, eective government
(i.e., in which the majority party's broad legislative agenda stands a chance of success)
depends on the support of a coalition of parties, rather than the majority party alone. Herein
lies the conundrum: Voters prefer certain coalitions, but ultimately they must choose just
one party instead of a coalition. Coalitions to build a government are not formed until after
the election. Although voters might anticipate the outcome of the coalition formation
process, it is generally not obvious what the outcome turns out to be. Which parties will
form the new government?
Thus, voters who are motivated to cast their vote eectively must somehow anticipate the
uncertainty induced by the government formation process and vote accordingly. In order to
do so, they must consider their most preferred coalition for their \calculus of voting". They
should end up with a voting strategy that is most likely to produce their preferred coalition,
but they might not cast a vote for their most preferred party. The nature of multiparty
systems and the coalition calculus evokes another, more nuanced - and ultimately more
complex - type of incentive for voters' decision-making that is dierent from that of the
\lesser evil" tactic. Such incentives have an impact on an individual voter that cannot be
accounted for by traditional models of electoral behavior.
Scholars of strategic voting are interested in explaining systematic deviations from predic-
tions made by traditional theories of voting. They explicitly consider non-personal determi-
nants that provide a certain incentive for a voter's decision calculus in order to model the
vote situation more realistically. Instead, strategic voting studies account for institutional
factors such as electoral rules and the nature of the party system, factors that determine
the context in which an election is held. Thus, theories of strategic voting go a step fur-
ther than traditional theories of electoral behavior, oering explanations of why behavioral
deviations from classical models' predictions might be meaningful for understanding the
motivations and constraints of \homo politicus".
Scholars of electoral behavior largely ignored strategic voting until the late 1980s. Since
then, several factors can be identied, however, that account for the increasing interest
in the study of strategic voting. On a theoretical level, the rise of rational choice theory
stimulated scholarly interest in questions about the incentives voters face within certain
institutional structures. Moreover, the rise of third-party candidates - and of viable third
parties in general - are political developments that have spawned interest in explanations
and political consequences of strategic voting behavior. Thus far, the focus of these studies
has been quite narrow, on plurality systems. Obviously, there are other electoral systems
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inducing dierent types of constraints for voters that lead them to deviate from their most
preferred candidate or party.
Finally, in tandem with these theoretical and political developments, recent methodological
developments within political science have had far-reaching implications for the strategic
voting literature, and particularly the research comparing dierent institutional settings.
Unlike two-party systems, voters in multiparty systems have several options that must be
modeled simultaneously in order to develop a realistic vote choice theory. The 1990s stand
for a new area in political methodology, the \Age of Maximum Likelihood". Since then, ad-
vances in computer technology have made it possible to program numerical estimators. By
extension, maximum likelihood estimators enable us to model simultaneously the likelihood
of a vote for various parties or candidates. Such, unordered variables cannot be modeled
within the traditional OLS framework These advances are of great help in coming to grips
with strategic voting in multiparty systems. The joint impact of theoretical, political and
methodological developments have therefore placed strategic voting very prominently on
the agenda of electoral behavior research at the beginning of the new millenium.
My focus will be on a type of institution with growing appeal,mixed electoral systems. The
common characteristic of these systems is that they employ both single-member districts
and multimember constituencies. Several countries, from New Zealand to Italy, have newly
adopted a variant of this system.2 Countries employing mixed electoral systems provide
an especially interesting case for studying strategic voting because a two-ballot system is
used; voters have the opportunity to split their vote in a strategic fashion. Which voting
strategies are they using?
I have set forth four research questions that I wish to answer about mixed electoral systems.
First, what strategies do voters employ in casting their votes for candidates or parties that
are not their rst choices? Second, to what extent do various forms of strategic voting
occur? Third, given that there is widespread ticket-splitting, how can strategic voters be
distinguished from non-strategic ticket-splitters? Finally, what are the political implications
of strategic voting? In order to answer these questions comprehensively, it will be necessary
to identify the various strategies at play, nd ways to quantify them, and assess their impact
on the electoral system.
My substantive contributions are twofold. First, I develop a theory of strategic voting
in mixed electoral systems, including hypotheses about situations in which certain voters
are particularly likely to behave strategically. Second, I present a solution to the problem
of distinguishing ticket-splitters from strategic voters. My methodological contributions
are also twofold. First, I will employ Gary Kings' Ecological Inference (EI) and show
that EI oers a new opportunity to the analysis of strategic voting. Second, in order
2) In fact, a recent survey of dierent mixed electoral systems found that no fewer than 29 countries
employ some form of mixed electoral system for elections to their (lower) chamber (Massicotte and
Blais, 1999).
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to simultaneously disentangle the eects distinguishing strategic from mere non-strategic
voting, while controlling for alternative hypotheses, I will employ an appropriate-choice
model.
The next chapter critically reviews the current state of the strategic voting literature. The
third chapter presents my theory. Building on insights from this literature, I will dene
important terms, conceptualize straight and split-ticket voting, develop my theory about
strategic voting and suggest possible ways to operationalize it. Chapter four constitutes
a part of my methodological contribution to the literature on strategic voting. I will show
that EI can be successfully applied in a multi-party context. In the following two analytical
chapters I will test my hypotheses that I derived in the theory chapter. The fth chapter
employs EI to test my rst hypothesis about strategic voting at the electoral district level.
Chapter six presents another analytical chapter addressing all remaining hypotheses about
strategic voting at the individual level. Finally, I will conclude this work by answering the
above posed research questions and discus the generalizability of my results for the eld of
electoral behavior and comparative politics in general.
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Chapter 2
A Framework for the Study of Strategic Voting
Various strands of the political science literature study strategic voting. The Nader example
at the opening of the last chapter makes apparent how several of these strands of the
literature would approach strategic voting. First, there is the institutionalist literature,
which is surveyed in section 2.2. These studies focus on the inuence of particular electoral
institutions on issues like representation, their eects on the number of parties in a political
system and on the eects of voting behavior more generally. Apparently, since it was
widely expected that Ralph Nader could not even win a single state in the 2000 presidential
election due to the plurality system, some of his supporters should have been motivated to
strategically cast a vote for the \lesser evil", Gore, in order to prevent a Bush victory.
Second, there is the political behavior literature, which treats electoral institutions as ex-
ogenous factors. Instead, this strand of the literature focuses on how strategic behavior
can be identied on the individual level. In the case of Nader, for instance, scholars in this
eld would identify a Nader supporter as strategic if she did not vote for Nader. Instead,
she avoided \wasting" her vote, since Nader was expected to have no chance of winning
the 2000 presidential election. With such a tight race between the two front-runners, on
the other hand, she stood to lose a great deal by helping to usher Bush into oce. Thus,
besides preferences about candidates, voter expectations about the viability of candidates
or the success of parties are also crucial determinants in strategic voting. I will review
the strategic voting literature in the eld of political behavior in section 2.3, in order to
assess the inuence of voter expectations about the outcome of an election on employing
dierent strategies in the voting booth. The theories of these studies are based on the
individual level. Since we cannot look in a voter's head, section 2.4 will also focus on the
ticket-splitting phenomenon in the political behavior literature asprima facie evidence for
mass strategic behavior at the polls.
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Recent adoptions of mixed electoral systems around the world have stimulated interest in
these kind of electoral institutions.1 The fact that people in mixed electoral systems may
cast two votes for the same level of governance at the same time is especially interesting
for the study of strategic voting. Voters are inclined to employ multiple strategies because
of the combination of plurality and proportional representation (PR) voting rules. I will
focus my analysis on one particular country that originated this system: Germany.
Germany's version of a mixed electoral system render it a very good choice, because the
country has an almost 50-year tradition of applying these rules in federal elections. In
this time period, it is argued, the German electorate has mounted sucient experience
with this rather complicated electoral system, which allows for two votes to be cast in
parliamentary elections. Thus, one would expect that whatever strategies voters can use in
such systems, they are likely to be crystallized - and observable - within the voting patterns
of recent German elections. My research will show how and why the specic electoral rules
in this system motivate certain strategies, and what the political consequences of strategic
voting will be. Presumably, similar strategies can also be expected in other mixed electoral
systems of the same sort.
In summary, my review of the literature will be organized in three dierent sections. To
aid the understanding of strategic voting in Germany as an example of a mixed electoral
system, I provide a short summary of the most important electoral rules in the following
section. I then take a closer look at the institutionalist literature on strategic voting in
section 2.2 and revisit the political behavior literature, focusing rst on questions about
the role of voter expectations in section 2.3, and then on the ticket-splitting phenomenon
in section 2.4.
2.1 Electoral Institutions of a Mixed Electoral System
Since 1953, German voters have used a two-vote ballot on Election Day for the election of
one institution, the federal parliament (Bundestag). The rst vote is for a local candidate
in the district, within a single-member district system. I call this vote thecandidate vote.
Plurality rule determines the winner of every district seat for the Bundestag. Half of the
seats in the Bundestag are allocated in this way. More important for the election outcome
is the second vote, which is a vote for a party list. The second vote, what I call the list
vote, proportionally allocates the total number of seats in the Bundestag to each party
according to the share of votes it garners in the election. This proportion allocated to each
party includes the district seats already won by member candidates in the candidate vote.
There are two deviations, however, within this \pure" proportional system. First, in order
to be represented in the Bundestag, a party has to gain at least 5% of the national list votes.
1) For a recent survey of various mixed electoral systems, see Massicotte and Blais (1999).
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This threshold assures that very small (read: fringe) parties cannot get into parliament.
Thus, a party receives no seats at all if it gets less than 5% of the list votes nationally.2
Second, if a party gains more district seats with the candidate vote than it is entitled to
based on its proportional share of the list votes, the party is allowed to keep these \surplus"
seats (Uberhangmandate). This comes about if a party consistently dominates the district
races on the rst ballot but is not successful to the same extent on the second ballot. Since
the large parties win most of the district seats, they are the primary beneciaries of this
rule. In fact, traditionally, the large party in the government has won these surplus seats,
thereby tacking on some more seats to a sometimes slim majority in the ruling coalition
government. Theoretically, this can go the other way around and lead to a dierent
majority of seats than the voters determined by the distribution of list vote shares. Thus
far, however, this case has not arisen: Germany's \Florida" is yet to come!
The current party system in Germany consists of two large parties, the Social Democratic
Party of Germany (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social
Union (CSU)3, each getting about 40% of the list votes, and three small parties - the Free
Democratic Party (FDP), the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and the Greens - each
garnering just over 5% of the list votes. CDU and FDP are the \incumbent coalition"
before the last federal election in 1998 for sixteen years. The parliamentary opposition
that tries to challenge the CDU/FDP coalition is comprised of the SPD and the Greens.
Local party organizations nominate candidates for district races, while party lists are left
up to the state party machine. For federal elections, Germany is divided into 328 electoral
districts. These electoral districts are geographic units that have roughly the same number
of eligible voters. Every electoral district elects one representative, the one who wins the
most candidate votes. Electoral districts are the smallest politically relevant geographic
unit because district seats are allocated at this level (Rae, 1971, p.19). An electoral district
should not be mistaken for an electoral precinct, which is the smallest geographic unit in
which voting returns are collected.
2) The 5% hurdle is trumped, however, if at least three of its candidates win their district races. In
this case the 5%-threshold does not apply and a party gains seats proportional to its list vote shares.
The classic example for this rule is the 1994 election, where the PDS, the former ruling party of the
German Democratic Republic (GDR), won four district seats in East Germany but failed to overcome
the threshold of 5% of the list vote shares. The PDS earned only 4.4% of the list votes nationally,
but since it won at least three district races, its list vote shares translated into 30 parliamentary seats.
Thus, small parties with little national appeal that nonetheless enjoy a regional following can also gain
representation.
3) I consider the CDU/CSU party alliance as inseparable. In fact, they do not compete in the same
districts. The CSU runs candidates only in Bavaria and the CDU everywhere else. For simplicity, I use
the CDU notation as a shorthand for this party alliance.
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2.2 Strategic Voting and the Institutionalist Literature
It is widely acknowledged that electoral laws inuence the number of parties competing
in a polity. Electoral laws also determine the ways in which parties interact and form
coalitions. This \institutionalist" line of research can be found in the works of scholars such
as Duverger (1954), Downs (1957), Leys (1959), Wildavsky (1959), Rae (1971), Riker
(1982), Taagepera and Shugart (1989), Lijphart (1994) and Cox (1997). An alternative
account is provided by a more sociologically-oriented school of thought (Grumm, 1958;
Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Sartori, 1968; von Beyme, 1985). These scholars see the number
of parties and the character of the party systems as predominately determined by the
number of cleavages in a given society. The important dierence between these accounts is
in the presumed direction of causality: Do the social and economic cleavages within a given
society determine the number of competing parties, and do these parties seek to manipulate
the electoral rules to their advantage, or do the electoral laws determine the number
of parties? Thus, do parties manipulate electoral institutions as the sociological school
proposes or do electoral institutions determine the number of parties, as the institutionalist
school contends? These questions raise an endogeneity problem: Parties can change
electoral laws (Grumm, 1958; Bawn, 1993), and yet electoral laws determine the party
system (Duverger, 1954). Although both schools of thought disagree over the direction of
causality, both still acknowledge the close association between proportional representation
with multiparty systems and single-member district elections with two-party systems.4
In his seminal treatment of political parties, Maurice Duverger (1954) connects party sys-
tems and electoral institutions with strategic voting in a fashion known asDuverger's Law.
This process has two phases. The rst phase is a \mechanical" one. Duverger argues that
electoral laws, which translate votes into seats in parliament, tend to overrepresent large
parties and, conversely, underrepresent small parties - an \inverse Robin-Hood-eect", so
to speak. The eect is inverse because the rich get more than they should and the poor
have to give instead.5 The second phase is \psychological". He theorizes that under a
certain electoral institution, namely plurality rule, voters feel that they will waste their vote
if they vote for a minor party or candidate. In order to avoid wasting their vote, he ar-
gues, voters tend to vote for a lesser evil to prevent the greater evil from attaining victory.
This behavior has come to be called strategic or sophisticated voting. I will dene these
concepts later in chapter 3. The process behind strategic voting in plurality systems is
described by Duverger's psychological factor: Voters try to avoid wasting their votes.
4) Certainly the best strategy to address this problem directly is to model it as a system of equations
using 2SLS. This has not yet been done in the literature. The second-best option to reconcile both
schools of thought is to use both sociological and institutional factors as separate independent variables
(Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; Powell, 1982) or as interaction terms (Neto and Cox, 1997).
5) Rae (1971) actually shows that such an \inverse Robin-Hood-eect" holds in many electoral systems,
irrespective of particular electoral rules.
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The rst attempt to empirically analyze the impact of the \Duvergerian" logic of strate-
gic voting over time was provided by Shively (1970). If the psychological factor works,
according to this reasoning, third parties or candidates should be strategically \deserted".
Shively measured this desertion by how successful third parties were in the subsequent
election given that voters build expectations about the success of parties based on the
previous election. However, using district-level data of the UK (1892-1966) and Germany
(1871-1933) he found that the psychological factor had only a trivial impact. Spaord
(1972) challenged Shively's ndings because he had not directly distinguished between sit-
uations where more or less strategic voting was to be expected. Spaord predicted that
third-party supporters should be more likely to desert their party and vote for another party
if the district race was close. He introduced the district margin - the dierence between
the rst two candidates or parties in that district - as an independent variable and found
evidence for Duverger's psychological factor: The closer the district race between the two
major parties, the smaller the vote shares of third parties.
The \desertion rate" stemming from plurality systems has to be adjusted to account for the
two-ballot system in mixed electoral systems. In the case of Germany, a candidate is said
to get strategically deserted (Barnes et al., 1962; Bawn, 1993, 1999; Cox, 1997; Fisher,
1973; Jesse, 1988) if the candidate gets fewer votes on the rst ballot (the candidate vote)
than the candidate's party does on the second ballot (the list vote). Barnes et al. (1962)
point out that both large parties, the CDU and the SPD, receive more candidate votes
than list votes, whereas the picture for the FDP is the other way around. Thus, small-party
candidates seem to be strategically deserted on the candidate vote. They conclude that
\: : : this seems to indicate a rather sophisticated understanding of the electoral law on the
part of some small-party followers" (Barnes et al., 1962, p. 910).
A more direct test for the presence of Duverger's psychological factor - and hence for
strategic desertion - is provided in studies using district-level data (Cox, 1997; Bawn, 1999).
Cox (1997) regresses the \desertion rate" among FDP and Green voters - the dierence
between their list vote and their candidate vote share in a district - on the margin of the
district race. In close district races, we should expect a higher desertion rate and therefore
more strategic votes, as strategic FDP or Green voters should feel a stronger incentive
not to waste their candidate votes. They could make a dierence and help elect the local
candidate of the larger coalition partner. In fact, using district-level data from federal
elections in 1987 and 1990, Cox does nd that the desertion rate among FDP and Green
voters is signicantly higher as the district race gets closer. Bawn (1999) also employs the
desertion rate concept, but with a dierent dependent variable, using district-level data
from six federal elections between 1969 and 1987. Controlling for incumbency eects,
she nds that the closer a district race is, the larger the desertion rate of major-party
candidates.
So far I have only discussed rationales for strategic voting, and ways to operationalize it, for
plurality-based systems. These rationales presumably apply to the plurality tier of mixed
electoral systems as well. Mixed electoral systems, however, combine plurality and PR
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mechanics. The literature has developed two rationales about the impact of proportional
representation on strategic voting.
The rst rationale is an extension of the strategic voting reasoning in plurality systems. Leys
(1959) and Sartori (1968) suggest that, since parties depend on overcoming the national
threshold to gain seats, the same \wasted-vote" logic from plurality systems should also
apply to PR systems, albeit to a lesser degree. Schoen (1999a) nds no evidence for this
dynamic in German national election studies from 1983, 1987 and 1994, however. Small
party supporters do vote for \their" party on the second ballot, no matter what; there is
no feasible alternative if they want to turn out. The \wasted-vote" logic only makes sense
if a small-party supporter's second preferred party would denitely gain representation in
parliament, and is almost tied with her most preferred one. Thus, I do not expect the
process to avoid wasting a vote to be credible enough to motivate strategic voting in a PR
system.
The second rationale for strategic voting in PR-type systems is qualitatively dierent from
the rst. Cox hypothesizes that the intention to vote strategically is fuelled by a \portfolio-
maximizing" logic (Cox, 1997, pp. 194-202). Voters no longer simply try to aect the
allocation of seats, for instance by strategically deserting trailing candidates. Instead,
they seek to maximize the representation, or \portfolio", of their preferred party in the
composition of the government. The empirical evidence for these kinds of behavior is very
thin and convoluted with alternative explanations. Several scholars (Jesse, 1988; Roberts,
1988; Cox, 1997) have suggested that, for the PR tier of the German system, a certain
ticket-splitting pattern - say, a candidate vote for the local CDU candidate and a list vote
for the FDP - is not necessarily evidence that the FDP candidate is strategically deserted
on the candidate vote as the \desertion rate" concept would predict. These authors submit
instead that there might be a strategy to support smaller parties on the list vote in order to
increase the chances for a certain coalition of parties to govern. This rationale undermines
the \desertion rate" logic because a strategic ticket-splitting pattern is predicted that does
not depend on the closeness of the district races - a necessary incentive to desert trailing
candidates. Theoretically, either plurality or PR mechanics might induce certain ticket-
splitting patterns that are seen as evidence for strategic voting. Thus, it remains unclear
whether certain ticket-splitting patterns occur because trailing candidates are deserted, or
because voters cast a strategic list vote to support a smaller coalition partner. Obviously,
the institutional literature convolutes both strategies. My contributions to this literature
will be to conceptually disentangle them and clarify the relationship between ticket-splitting
and strategic voting.
Apart from strategic voting, there are two further alternative explanations for ticket-
splitting. One possibility is that voters indeed deviate from the local candidate of their
most preferred party if there is a more compelling candidate running in this district. This
routine is called a \personal vote" (Cain et al., 1987). The result would be that voters
split their ticket, casting a vote for their most preferred candidate and for their most pre-
ferred party. There are two studies about personal votes in Germany. Lancaster (1998)
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and Bawn (1999) use district-level data and show that there is an \incumbency eect" for
local party candidates. However, their analysis does not control for party strength in the
districts. A voter could simply vote for the candidate of her most preferred party without
knowing anything about this particular candidate. If a party is traditionally strong in a dis-
trict, that party's candidate should also do well in that district, no matter what. This does
not necessarily mean that voters systematically cast a personal vote for this candidate. It
is not clear whether such an \incumbency eect" is really due to personal votes or just
rationalizations of party strength. If the district leans predominantly toward one party, such
that the district race is a foregone conclusion, then some voters could instead vote for a
hopeless candidate so as to send a \personalized issue message" or demonstrate some sort
of protest to the major parties. For instance, a vote for a Green candidate who has no
chance to win the district race could be seen as a \pro-environment message" (Cox, 1997,
p. 83).
A second alternative explanation for ticket-splitting is that voters simply do not understand
the electoral rules. Schmitt-Beck (1993) presents evidence from pre-election polls in 1990
that indicate that a majority of the respondents does not know whether the list vote is more
important than the candidate vote. Since all parties remind voters during the campaign
about the electoral rules, however, I expect that these numbers are quite dierent on
Election Day. Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 2.1, a note is printed on the ballot to
once again remind voters that they have two votes and that the list vote is the decisive
one.6
Parallel to the empirical literature about the inuence of electoral institutions on vote
choice, there is a growing body of formal treatments of strategic voting. Although most of
the work deals with strategic behavior in legislative bodies (Farquharson, 1969; Shepsle and
Weingast, 1984; Austen-Smith, 1987), some scholars try to build formal models of voting
behavior in mass elections (Tsebelis, 1986; Cox, 1997; Myatt, 2000). The common theme
in these models is that rational voters have preferences about parties and candidates, that
they form expectations or beliefs about the outcome of an election, and that they act
within certain institutional constraints to maximize their expected utility. Constraints are
usually conceptualized as a particular incentive structure determined by the electoral rules
and characteristics of the electoral district, like the expectation about district-wide voter
preference or the size of a district. The so-called \pivotal likelihood ratio" (Homan, 1982;
McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1972; Myerson and Weber, 1993; Cox, 1994, 1997) is derived
as a measure for the likelihood that a rational voter abandons her most preferred party or
candidate, based on that voter's expectation surrounding other voters' behaviors. These
studies predict a unique Duvergerian equilibrium, in which voters only support two candi-
dates and, in order to avoid wasting their vote, strategically desert the others. Particularly,
Cox (1994, 1997) also predicts a non-Duvergerian equilibrium, where no strategic voting
occurs because it is not clear who the trailing candidates are.
6) In order to illustrate this, in Figure 2.1 I have translated the instructions on the ballot for district 253
(Berlin-Zehlendorf-Steglitz) into English.
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Figure 2.1: A Ballot from the 1998 Elections in Germany
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These predictions are challenged in several ways. Some have claimed (Benoit et al., 2000;
Fisher, 2000) that neither equilibrium is empirically plausible, as these strong formal results
are based on unrealistic assumptions about voters. Another challenge comes from formal
modelers themselves. A very promising attempt to develop a more realistic model of
strategic voting is provided by Myatt (2000). He allows that not everyone needs to have
the same expectation about the outcome of the district race. Thus, he does introduce
uncertainty about the district-wide support of the party or candidates in the model to
make the assumption more realistic. Although far from answering the question of what
the mechanisms of strategic voting are within certain institutional designs, formal models
have improved the naive intuition about strategic voting based on Duverger's Law. The
amount of strategic voting probably diers from system to system, and must be explained
dierently, depending on the respective electoral rules. It is one of the key achievements of
Gary Cox's seminal treatment of the subject (Cox, 1997) to provide evidence that strategic
voting occurs across many institutional settings. In addition to plurality systems, formal
models also provide some rationales for strategic voting in PR systems as well. Cox and
Shugart (1996) show that the wasted-vote logic comes in two types. First, hopeless parties
with no chance of winning seats are deserted to avoid wasting votes. Second, even leading
party lists are deserted to some degree because they do not need these \excess votes"
(Cox and Shugart, 1996, p. 301).
2.3 Strategic Voting and Voter Expectations
With its emphasis on the individual voter's mindset going to the polls, the strategic voting
literature in the eld of political behavior conceptualizes voter expectations about the suc-
cess of various parties and candidates as an incentive to behave strategically and tonot
cast a vote for their most preferred choice. The aforementioned Nader example demon-
strates that voters not only form preferences about parties and candidates, as traditional
theories of electoral behavior suggest, but also that they weigh the prospects of parties and
candidates within the electoral rules before they go into the voting booth. Many voters
might have preferred Nader over Gore, but ended up casting a vote for the latter because
they did not expect Nader to be competitive, and moreover, because they expected the
top two contenders to be neck-in-neck. Depending on their expectations, therefore, voters
decide whether to stick with or to desert their most preferred candidate. Given a particular
institutional setting, the questions then arise as to how voters derive their expectations
about the outcome of an upcoming election, and why this should have a credible impact
on their decision calculus.
There are two main processes by which voters derive expectations. First, attentive voters
follow the discussions about coalition options, along with pre-election polls during the
campaign. It seems clear, however, that this process can only have an impact on the
decision calculus of attentive, and therefore political aware and informed, voters. Since
voters do not face a tabula rasa situation in the voting booth, there is surely a second
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process at play, through which even voters who do not follow the campaign closely can
be seen to form expectations. They adopt what I call the electoral history heuristic. As
\cognitive misers" (Fiske and Taylor, 1991), individuals frequently employ heuristics to
simplify their decision-making processes. Voters look back to previous elections. Even
if they cannot recall the correct result of these elections, they can easily form beliefs at
least about the rough coordinates of the competitive electoral landscape. Inferences based
on these beliefs need not to be particular accurate. It is sucient that voters have an
idea about who the strong contenders are or which coalitions are typically formed. So
together, both of these processes help voters cope with the uncertainty of an election
and generate their expectations about the success of parties and coalitions. Voters create
new expectations or simply update their prior beliefs about the outcome of an election in
Bayesian fashion.7
While the party or candidate with the most votes is the winner of an election in plurality
systems, PR-type systems are less clear-cut. The most successful party might not nec-
essarily form the government. In PR systems, the government depends on the support
of more than just one parliamentary party because no party alone will have a reasonable
chance to gain a majority of seats in parliament. Coalition politics, therefore, determine
the government formation process (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988; Laver and Schoeld,
1990; Pappi and Eckstein, 1998). Voters are motivated to anticipate this fact and form
expectations about the success of parties and coalitions. Expectations about the viability
of certain candidates, parties or coalitions come into play when voters make a decision
whether to desert their most preferred choice and for whom to vote instead. Thus, voters
are no mere servants of their preferences, as traditional models of voting behavior would
have us believe. Quite to the contrary, as in Goldoni's famous play, voters are \servants
of two masters": their preferences and their expectations.
In order to assess the impact of voters' expectations about the success of parties and candi-
dates, there are generally two conceivable measurement strategies. First, some scholars ask
respondents directly about the prospects of parties or candidates at the election. Abram-
son et al. (1992), for instance, investigate strategic voting on Super Tuesday in the 1988
presidential primaries. They measure the probability that a given candidate will get the
nomination via a normalization procedure from a hundred-point scale. Blais and Nadeau
(1996) also rely on subjective measures for voter expectations. Using the 1988 Canadian
Election Study, they employ a likelihood scale on which respondents indicate the probability
that a certain party or candidate will win. The main problem with this approach is that
subjective measures are prone to projection eects. That is, voters are wishful thinkers
who perceive their favored candidates as having better chances to win than others (Bar-
tels, 1988; Brady and Johnston, 1987). The social cognition literature oers three similar
explanations of why projection eects come about. One of these, which stems from cog-
7) Formal theorists employ a similar argument to make plausible the assumption that voters form \rational
expectations" (Cox, 1997; Cox and Shugart, 1996; Fey, 1997). There is also experimental evidence
that the electoral history heuristic facilitates generating consistent expectations (Forsythe et al., 1993).
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nitive balance theory (Heider, 1958), is that people try to avoid \cognitive dissonance"
and therefore need to \balance out" their expectations with their preferences. Another
explanation is that people falsely infer from self-relevant categories to others. \Since I like
this party, others do so, too". This type of projection is also called \false consensus" eect
(Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Conover and Feldman, 1989). A third explanation is based on
the theory of \motivated reasoning" (Kunda, 1990; Lodge and Taber, 2000). Perceptions
about the prospects of parties and candidates are biased, because if we like them, we want
them to be successful, and therefore overestimate their likelihood for success.
One way to deal with this problem is to model projection eects directly using a systems-of-
equations approach. Abramson et al. (1992) follow this strategy and use a 3SLS approach
to purge their candidate probability scores to win nomination. This strategy requires strong
assumptions about the factors that are, presumably, not contaminated with projection ef-
fects in order to model them. A more promising way to deal with projection is to simply
design instruments that minimize such eects. Thurner and Pappi (1998, 1999), for in-
stance, employ a 4-point Likert-scale to measure voters' expectation whether minor parties
in Germany will gain seats in the next election. Presumably, projection eects are more
prevalent on 100-point scales than on smaller scales.
Instead of \subjective" measures to gauge voters' perceptions that a candidate or party is
likely to win, a second measurement strategy is to employ \objective" measures of voter
expectations. Such context variables are based on actual election returns (Black, 1978,
1980; Cain, 1978). Alvarez and Nagler (2000) provide an interesting application of this
methodology with data from the British general election in 1987. The basic crux of this
approach is to construct a vote-choice model for sincere voting in a multiparty setting
based on individual-level data, and to add the district-level results of the previous election
as a measure for the \expected" closeness of the district race. Indeed, they nd that third
party supporters are more likely to desert their party if they \expect" a competitive district
race.8
The implicit assumption in this model is that a supporter of a third party isa priori equally
likely to vote for one of the other parties. This determinism stemming from simple three-
party races in plurality systems like the UK makes their approach less appealing for appli-
cation to the mixed electoral systems with usually more than three parties and a history of
coalition between parties. Viable coalition options provide valuable information, both for
8) Some scholars prefer clearly exogenous measures for voter expectations and employ district results
of the previous election. Presumably, this is readily available for voters. Other scholars prefer to
employ results of the current election. The disadvantage is obvious: How could a voter know the
outcome before the election? In response, supporters of using current-election data retort that using
results from the very same election better approximates pre-election polls in that district than results
from the previous election, which usually do not exist in mixed electoral systems. Data from earlier
elections might not represent the current situation at all. The closeness of the race or the personality
of the candidates might be dierent today than in prior elections. Using current results has the added
advantage that it does not assume that people stayed in the same district since the previous election.
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the theory-building process as well as the estimation process, that should not be eschewed.
Besides, measures of expectations that assume cross-constituency variance will evidently
not capture strategic incentives of the PR tier in a mixed electoral system.
Most of the studies about strategic voting in the political behavior literature refer to the UK,
with some emphasizing the U.S. Apparently, since the underlying process of why strategic
voters do not vote for their most preferred candidate or party seems to be identied,
the dominant theme in the literature devolves to the \who-gets-the-numbers-right" game
(Niemi et al., 1992; Evans and Heath, 1993a; Niemi et al., 1993; Franklin et al., 1994;
Evans and Heath, 1993b; Alvarez and Nagler, 2000). Moreover, all these studies are build
on a rather unrealistic understanding of the strategichomo politicus, according to which all
voters seem to have the same proclivity to vote strategically. This premise might hold true
within the connes of the Rochester school, but not in the real world. The prerequisites
for strategic voting are that a voter understands the strategic rationales and that she be
able and motivated to employ them. Given these constraints, it seems utterly certain that
voters vary widely in their proclivity to vote strategically. Voting behavior, as every type
of behavior, is not only situational but also dispositional determined.
Apart from this assumption, as well as the preoccupation with getting an accurate estimate
of the amount of strategic voting, these studies have yet another characteristic in common.
They are based on essentially the same electoral institutions: a single-member district
plurality system. As such, there has been less concern in the literature of how dierent
electoral systems might induce dierent types of strategic behavior. While there are some
studies about strategic voting in PR systems (Thurner and Pappi, 1998, 1999), strategic
voting in mixed electoral systems has not yet been addressed. My dissertation lls this gap
in the literature.
2.4 Strategic Voting and Ticket Splitting
From the literature about electoral institutions and party systems in section 2.2, it seems
reasonable to look at the group of ticket-splitters in order to identify strategic voters.
Although this literature provides no individual-level evidence, the hypothesis is that at least
some voters might anticipate the electoral rules and do not vote for their most preferred
party or candidate, but for a lesser-preferred candidate with a greater chance of winning.
The study of split-ticket voting in mixed electoral systems has enjoyed a surge of attention in
the last few years, especially about Germany (Hilmer and Schleyer, 2000; Schoen, 1999a,b;
Thurner and Pappi, 1998, 1999). Ticket-splitting is hardly a new topic in the American
political science literature (Beck et al., 1992; Burden and Kimball, 1998; Campbell and
Miller, 1957; DeVries and Tarrance, 1972; Fiorina, 1992; Mebane, 2000), but here the
understanding of ticket-splitting - i.e., voting for candidates of dierent parties for dierent
levels of governance - diers from its meaning in mixed electoral systems.
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The literature on ticket-splitting in Germany concentrates on the role of voter characteris-
tics that facilitate this phenomenon. Baker et al. (1981) provide evidence at the aggregate
level that the decline of partisan strength parallels the rise of ticket-splitting. On the indi-
vidual level, at least based on bivariate analysis, Hilmer and Schleyer (2000) characterize
ticket-splitters in the 1998 federal election as young, well-educated and highly interested
in politics. They also nd that self-employed voters are more likely to split their ticket.
The scholarly work on German ticket-splitting behavior has at least three major weaknesses.
First, the studies are mostly descriptive, and thus data-driven. They develop no theory of
why certain people are more or less likely to split their ticket. Second, ticket-splitters are
always treated as a homogeneous group. This oversimplication of the ticket-splitting
phenomenon obscures the more likely scenario that there are many dierent reasons why
voters split their tickets, and presumably also strategic ones. The literature fails to ac-
knowledge these subtleties. Instead, ticket-splitters are lumped together in one group and
scholars focus solely on the attitudinal and demographic dierences between them and
straight-ticket voters. The third weakness is of a methodological nature. Scholars use
inappropriate probability models (Schoen, 1999a) or rely on bivariate analysis (Hilmer and
Schleyer, 2000). A choice model would allow disentangling non-strategic ticket splitters
from strategic ticket-splitters while accounting for factors related to straight-ticket voting.
In summary, scholars in the political behavior literature employ various methodologies to
study the impact on strategic voting of voter expectations about the outcome of an elec-
tion. What seem to be missing in this literature are more detailed hypotheses about the
proclivity to register a vote strategically, as well as its direction, as compared to registering
a non-strategic vote. On a meta-theoretical level, almost all studies, no matter what par-
ticular methodology they employ, have a model of non-strategic or sincere voting as their
null hypothesis and specify conditions under which it can be rejected. The central insight
to be drawn from the political behavior literature is that only systematic deviation from
sincere voting, as baseline behavior, can be considered strategic. Thus a theory of strate-
gic voting must set forth a rationale for sincere voting and derive dierent strategies that
motivate systematic deviations from the baseline behavior. By extension, the implication
for mixed electoral systems is that only certain ticket-splitting patterns can be considered
strategic. In order to model this appropriately, I have to distinguish between strategic and
non-strategic ticket splitters as well as straight-ticket voters.
The review of the institutionalist literature further shows that there is no model yet address-
ing strategic voting in mixed electoral systems combining a plurality system and proportional
system. My goal is to bridge these two worlds. While the process behind strategic voting
in plurality systems seems to be identied, there is not much theoretical work and empirical
evidence for strategic voting in PR systems.
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Chapter 3
A Theory of Strategic Voting in a Mixed Electoral System
In this chapter I will develop my theory about strategic voting. To facilitate an under-
standing of the notion of strategic voting, the next section denes important terms like
straight- and split-ticket voting. In the second section I will present my theory and derive
several hypotheses from it. These hypotheses will speak to dierent level of analysis, on
the electoral district level and the individual level. The third sections lays out how I will go
about testing these hypotheses. What models must I estimate in order to test my hypothe-
ses, and what are the data requirements for doing so? Since they speak to two dierent
levels I will divide this section also into two subsections, one dealing with methods and
test of the hypothesis on the aggregate level and the other one dealing with the remaining
individual-level hypotheses.
3.1 Conceptualization
A two-ballot system provides ample opportunity for voters in a mixed electoral system to
split their ticket in an election for the same level of governance. In federal elections in
Germany, for example, voters have two votes: a candidate vote and a list vote. A voter is
said to cast a straight ticket if she casts her candidate vote for the local candidate of the
same party she casts her list vote for. Thus, the party of the candidate and party list she
votes for are one and the same. Otherwise, she casts a split ticket.
Since the list vote is the important vote - determining as it does each party's seat share
in parliament - district races, which are determined by the candidate vote, are not very
inuential, and therefore not of utmost importance to many voters. In addition, it is often
argued (Sartori, 1994; Thurner and Pappi, 1999) that in electoral systems in which people
vote for a party list, a candidate's room to maneuver is diminished by strong party discipline,
and therefore candidates are less prominent than the party itself. Consequently, surveys
regularly show that respondents seldom know the names of their local party candidates
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(Kaase, 1984). Moreover, research in social and political psychology (Fiske and Taylor,
1991; Lodge and Hamil, 1986) has shown that voters employ simplifying strategies, or
short cuts, such as party schemas, to cope with their limited cognitive resources, rather
than engaging in any systematic or formal \voting calculus". Figure 2.1 shows that on the
ballot for the candidate vote in Germany, the name of local party candidates are presented
with their respective party labels.
What is the particular impact of using the party label heuristic on the way people cast their
two votes? Voters presumably employ this heuristic in order to facilitate their candidate
vote decision. Instead of tuning into the local race and gathering information about the
local party candidates, it seems more cognitively ecient to cast their candidate vote
simply for the local candidate of their most preferred party. Voters have only to form
preferences about parties. This type of voter casts a vote for a particular candidate simply
because she likes the given candidate's party best among the available choices. She does
not carefully compare various local candidates because she simply infers from the party label
what candidate she prefers most. By this logic, a straight ticket consists of twosincere
votes because it is a vote for the most preferred candidate as well as the most preferred
party. A party's loyal base, as I call it, consists of straight-ticket voters like these.1 A
conclusion from the discussion, found in section 2.3, of previous work on strategic voting
in the political behavior literature is that, in order to conceptualize strategic voting, one
must set sincere behavior as a baseline in order to judge whether some type of behavioral
pattern is a systematic deviation from this baseline. Given the dominance of parties, as
compared to individual candidates in mixed electoral systems, a straight ticket is an obvious
choice for such a sincere baseline behavior.2 Since it seems reasonable to assume as baseline
behavior that voters cast a straight ticket, why should people split their ticket in the rst
place? What are the motivations that lead some people to deviate from this baseline?
Indubitably, voters do not make their decisions in a vacuum. The individual voting act as
determined by attitudes and personal preferences is always couched in a speciccontext. By
context I mean non-individual factors that characterize the situation in which an election
is held. Such a situation is not only characterized by the \supply" side of the political
system, i.e., by salient issues or various parties and candidates. It is also determined by the
electoral rules, because inevitably, voters form expectations about the election outcome
or the chances of victory for certain parties and candidates. This assessment is made
within the rules of an electoral system. Thus, because of the incentives induced by the
1) I assume that voters have one set of party preferences. In the end, whether voters have two dierent
preference orders for parties and local candidates is an empirical question that had yet to be addressed
in the literature.
2) This assumption is supported by survey data as well. According to recall questions in election studies,
the majority of German voters at least cast straight tickets. Even if voters do not vote for their most
preferred candidate or party but somehow still cast a straight ticket, it is reasonable to assume that
this sooner exemplies idiosyncratic reasoning than systematic behavior. I therefore do not bias my
results in boldly dening straight-ticket voters as sincere voters.
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electoral context, for some voters it is not rational to vote for their most preferred choice.
Referring again to the Nader example, some of his supporters presumably did not vote for
him because the plurality rule virtually guaranteed that Nader could not win any delegate in
the Electoral College. Voters are dened as strategic if, because of contextual incentives,
they end up not voting for their most preferred choice. Since it is conceptually not helpful
to simply dene any deviation from a sincere behavior baseline as strategic, it is reasonable
to add some criterion to the denition of strategic voting to specify that only systematic
deviations are considered strategic. The requirement of a systematic deviation implies
for mixed electoral systems that only certain ticket-splitting patterns can be considered
strategic. What form of strategic voting do voters employ in mixed electoral systems,
and how does this relate to ticket-splitting? In order to conceptualize this appropriately,
it is necessary to distinguish between at least three dierent types of voters: strategic
ticket-splitters, non-strategic ticket-splitters and straight-ticket voters.
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses
Preferences for issues, parties and candidates - however they are formed - are not the
only factors that determine a voter's decision at the polls as traditional studies of voting
behavior would suggest. This study argues instead that voters also have reasons to take
the electoral rules and possible coalitions of parties into consideration. Depending on their
formed or updated expectations about the outcome of the election, voters might end up
not voting for their most preferred candidate or party. They vote strategically instead.
What kind of strategies do voters employ? I will demonstrate that in a two-ballot system,
strategic voting comes in more than just one form.
The rst strategy results in what, following Cox (1997), I will call an ordinary strategic
vote3. The reasoning behind an ordinary strategic vote is the well-known Duvergerian logic
of not \wasting" a vote on a hopeless candidate (Duverger, 1954). To make this point
clear, assume that a voter most prefers the Free Democratic Party (FDP), a small party
that usually garners around 5% of the total list-vote shares. I will call such a voter an FDP-
supporter.4 She would cast a sincere vote for the FDP with her list vote. But for whom
should she vote with her candidate vote? It is unlikely that the FDP candidate will win the
district race. Therefore, it is not rational (Downs, 1957) to vote for her most preferred
candidate. In order to avoid wasting her candidate vote, she could vote strategically for
the next most preferred candidate who has a chance to win. Since the FDP formed the
governing coalition together with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) before the last
election, and since the CDU candidate has a much better chance to win, she casts her
3) This is similar to the logic behind strategic voting in the UK (Niemi et al., 1992; Evans and Heath,
1993a; Niemi et al., 1993; Franklin et al., 1994; Evans and Heath, 1993b).
4) Note being a party supporter is merely a predispositional characterization. It does not speak directly
to observed behavior.
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candidate vote strategically for the CDU candidate. Thus, thiswasted-vote strategy leads
to an ordinary strategic candidate vote and a sincere list vote. In shorthand, I call such
voters ordinary strategic voters.
Figure 3.1: Strategic Behavior of an FDP Supporter.
Candidate Vote List Vote
FDP Supporter
ordinary strategic      sincere vote
vote
CDU 1 FDP 2
Figure 3.1 summarizes my theory about the type of voting behavior of anordinary strategic
voter. If an FDP supporter anticipates the odds that her candidate is not likely to win the
district race, and if she does not intend to waste her vote, these incentives might be strong
enough to lead her to deviate from her most preferred district candidate. Instead of casting
a vote for the local FDP representative, she would cast an ordinary strategic vote for the
CDU representative on the candidate vote. Thus, she would end up splitting her ticket
strategically, since she will cast a sincere list vote for her party on the second ballot.5
The same reasoning applies to the SPD and the Greens as a viable coalition of parties
on the left. Strategic Green supporters, like FDP supporters, would also split their ticket
strategically. Since a Green candidate has no chance to win a district race, strategic Green
supporters follow the wasted-vote strategy and cast an ordinary strategic vote on the
candidate vote for the SPD candidate and a sincere list vote for the Greens.
5) A list vote for the FDP is not wasted. On the contrary, list-vote shares are aggregated on the national
level and determine the total number of seats in parliament to which a party is entitled.
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Besides the strategy for the candidate vote, there is a separate strategy at play in casting
the list vote. Consider a voter who most prefers the CDU. As a CDU supporter, she votes
sincerely for the CDU candidate with her candidate vote, but should she cast her list vote
for the CDU as well? It is unlikely that the CDU get a majority of the seats in parliament
to form a one-party government. Fuelled by prior experience, i.e., following theelectoral
history heuristic, the expectation is that the CDU needs a coalition partner.
Meanwhile, a small party like the FDP might have a hard time gaining the minimum of
5% of the list-vote shares. As suggested earlier, if the small party fails to overcome the
5%-threshold, it will not come into (or remain in) parliament and the CDU would have no
partner to govern with. A hypothetical example helps illustrate this point.
Figure 3.2 shows two scenarios with similar election outcomes each with the same vote total
for the CDU and FDP together but each with vastly dierent consequences for governing.
In the rst scenario, the FDP fails to overcome the 5% threshold, and as a result does
not win any seats in parliament. Hence, there would be neither a CDU/FDP-coalition nor
a majority for the CDU alone. A CDU supporter obviously does not want this outcome
to happen. In the second scenario, the FDP overcomes the 5% threshold and gains 35
seats in parliament. Hence, the FDP can form a coalition with the CDU. This is the most
preferred outcome not only for FDP supporters but also for CDU supporters, given that a
one-party government is out of reach in multiparty systems.
Figure 3.2: A Hypothetical Example. The Importance of Coalition Votes on List Vote
Shares.
- .2%
Scenario (1) Scenario (2)
List Votes # of Seats List Votes # of Seats
CDU 2 45.2% 306 45.0% 305
FDP 2   4.9% ---           + .2%   5.1%   35
Total 50.1% 306 50.1% 340
Outcome No Majority of Seats! Majority of Seats!
(Majority = 329 Seats, discounting “Surplus Seats”)
What can our hypothetical voter do, since she most prefers the CDU? Instead of casting
her list vote for the most preferred party, she would cast her vote strategically for the junior
partner of her most preferred coalition, the FDP, to ensure that the party will overcome 5%
and will be able to join the CDU in a coalition. This is a strategic vote because the FDP is
not her most preferred party. I will call a vote to ensure the representation of a prospective
Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistik und Wissenschaft, Bd. 2/2004 31
Thomas Gschwend
coalition partner in parliament a coalition vote. Thus, this strategy leads to a sincere vote
on the candidate vote and a strategic coalition vote on the list vote. I call such strategic
voters coalition voters. If the FDP is close to 5%, even a small number of coalition voters
(in the above example about :2 %) can determine the fate of the CDU/FDP coalition.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the strategy for the list vote. A CDU supporter casts a sincere
candidate vote for the local CDU candidate. If she supports a CDU/FDP coalition and
expects that the FDP will have a hard time to overcome the national threshold of 5%
of all list votes, these incentives might be so strong as to lead her to deviate from her
most preferred party. She would strategically cast a coalition vote for the FDP in order to
ensure that the smaller coalition partner, the FDP, is represented in parliament. Again, the
same reasoning holds for an SPD supporter. Given the expectation that a one-party SPD
government is out of reach, this SPD supporter rather supports a coalition with the Greens.
She would cast a sincere candidate vote for the local SPD candidate but strategically casts
a coalition vote for the Green party list in order to ensure the representation of the Greens
as a potential coalition partner in parliament.
Figure 3.3: Strategic Behavior of a CDU Supporter.
Candidate Vote List Vote
CDU Supporter
sincere vote   coalition vote
     (strategic)
CDU 1 FDP 2
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In summary, I hypothesize that there are two types of strategic behavior in mixed electoral
systems such as that found in Germany. Depending on their predisposition, strategic voters
either choose a strategy for the candidate vote or for the list vote, but not for both votes
simultaneously. Small-party supporters employ the wasted-vote strategy for the candidate
vote following the Duvergerian logic. For supporters of a major party there is thecoalition
insurance strategy to support small coalition partners on the list vote. The nature of the
party system, the history of past coalition formations, the electoral history heuristic, and
the particular national threshold are all factors that converge to determine which coalitions
are seen as viable. These factors vary across dierent mixed electoral systems, but the
underlying strategies should apply uniformly to other mixed electoral systems as well. Voters
employing the coalition insurance strategy are called coalition voters and voters trying to
avoid wasting their candidate vote are called ordinary strategic voters.
Figure 3.4: Hypothesized Strategies and Actual Voting Pattern.
Predisposition Hypothesized Voting Pattern Actual Voting Pattern
Party Supporter Electoral Calculus Candidate
Vote
List
Vote
Candidate
Vote
List
Vote
Sincere Straight Ticket ____ sincere sincere CDU 1 CDU 2
CDU Supporter
Strategic Split Ticket
“Coalition Insurance” Strategy
____ sincere strategic
CDU 1 FDP 2
Strategic Split Ticket
“Wasted-Vote” Strategy
____ strategic sincere
FDP Supporter
Sincere Straight Ticket ____ sincere sincere FDP 1 FDP 2
Figure 3.4 shows that major-party supporters use a dierent strategy than small-party
supporters. As a major-party supporter, in the above example it is a CDU supporter, two
dierent paths systematically describe a voter's decision calculus. One option is to cast a
straight ticket for her party. Her candidate as well as her list vote would be sincere, because
it supports her most preferred party and candidate. Another option is to strategically split
her ticket. If she decides to go down this path she would casts a sincere vote for her
most preferred candidate and a strategic coalition vote for the smaller coalition partner,
that is apparently not her most preferred option. Thus, strategic voters who support one
of the major parties employ the coalition insurance strategy in order to help the smaller
coalition partner to overcome 5% and ensure a majority for her most preferred coalition.
She would end up casting a candidate vote for the CDU and list vote for the FDP. The
same reasoning applies to the SPD and the Greens. Note this strategy is similar to what
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Cox calls \threshold insurance strategy" (Cox, 1997, pp. 197-198). The major dierence,
however, is that he does not conceptually distinguish strategies from actual voting patterns.
Figure 3.4 shows that the same voting pattern is a result of various strategic considerations
and not simply of a single strategy.
A minor-party supporter - in the above example, it is an FDP supporter - has a dierent
decision calculus, the description of which also entails two systematic paths. She could
cast a straight ticket for her party, the FDP, and thus her candidate vote as well as the
list vote would be sincere, supporting as it does her most preferred party and candidate.
She also could strategically split her ticket. If she takes this path, she casts an ordinary
strategic candidate vote and a sincere list vote. Thus, strategic voters who support one of
the minor parties in parliament employ the wasted-vote strategy in order to avoid casting
her vote for a hopeless candidate. She would strategically support the CDU candidate and
cast a list vote to support her most preferred party, the FDP. Again, the same reasoning
applies to the SPD and the Greens. A supporter of the Greens could strategically cast her
candidate vote for the SPD but her list vote for the Greens.
The informational requirements to vote strategically are very modest. Voter awareness of
German coalition politics is very high, and the question of \who-goes-with-whom?" can be
easily considered a by-product of everyday politics. They are in the realm of \folk politics",
the popular understanding of politics in Germany. Adopting theelectoral history heuristic,
voters have similar expectations about the viability of certain coalitions. Election campaigns
do the rest. They inform people about the electoral rules and make sure that people know
that the list vote is the decisive vote. Especially campaigns of the smaller coalition partners
allude to the strategic options of casting a coalition vote (Roberts, 1988). My theory
of strategic voting takes into account coalition preferences and expectations about their
success. For one, in a multiparty system strategic voters anticipate that no single party
has a reasonable chance to win the majority of the seats in parliament; hence coalitions
are necessary. The problem is that voters cannot choose a coalition formation with their
vote. Instead, they vote for a single party. By implication, there is ordinarily a large margin
of uncertainty in the government formation process. Voters cannot be too sure about how
the coalition formation process of the political elite will turn out to be.
Strategic voters have expectations about the success of viable coalition formation and
anticipate the incentives resulting from dierent electoral rules for the candidate and the
list vote. For these voters there is no way to be better o than to split their tickets in a
certain - by my theory - a priori dened way. By positing only certain split-ticket patterns
as strategic, I explicitly develop a directional theory of split-ticket patterns as a systematic
deviation from the (sincere) straight-ticket baseline behavior.
My theory addresses not only the amount of strategic voting, but also the process and
direction of strategic ticket-splitting. In fact, the idea to use an a priori reduction of
possible ticket-splitting patterns to dene strategic voting is not uncommon. In a dierent
context, Farquharson, for instance, denes a strategy as \sophisticated" (Farquharson,
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1969, pp. 38-40), what I call strategic, that which produces a best outcome given certain
incentives by successively eliminating other outcomes. I employ conceptually the same
approach and a priori eliminate ticket-splitting patterns that do not make sense except for
idiosyncratic reasons.
For the case of Germany, how tenable is the assumption that only a CDU/FDP and a
SPD/Green coalition are the viable coalition formations? Some voters, in fact, might
favor three-party coalitions. However, there is no way that, with only two votes, they
could enhance the likelihood of such a coalition. But what about the \Grand Coalition"
between the two main parties, the CDU and the SPD? Neither casting a straight ticket for
the CDU or the SPD, nor splitting the ticket between these parties, will make supporters
of these parties better o in order to achieve their favored coalition outcome. Although
this coalition is always a theoretical option of last resort in German politics, the two major
parties formed the government only between 1966 and 1969. Clearly, the party leadership
of the major parties tries to avoid such a constellation. Rather they try to form a \minimum
winning coalition" (Riker, 1962), given the ideological constraints within the party system.
A major party will certainly have more inuence over the government in a coalition with
a small party than in the \ Grand Coalition". The odds of forming a \Grand Coalition"
depend on the size and the bargaining power of the smaller parties in theBundestag. Of
course, a voter who prefers such a coalition should vote for a major party but this only
helps the party which gets her list vote and does not send a signal that this particular
voter prefers the \Grand Coalition". Whether this voter casts a straight ticket or splits
the ticket is also irrelevant in terms of her coalition preferences, since the candidate vote
does not determine the distribution of the party seat shares in parliament. There is no
strategy for a voter that can enhance the likelihood of getting a CDU/SPD coalition than
a straight ticket for one of them, and this is not dierent from casting a sincere vote
for one of these parties. Again, there is no equilibrium strategy that makes supporters
of such a coalition better o. It is up to the respective party elites of each of the two
main parties to determine whether this coalition is to be formed after the election. Voters
cannot inuence this decision. Furthermore, a coalition between two small parties could
never win a majority. For all practical purposes, therefore, both a coalition of two major
parties and of two small parties can be safely ignored.
Moreover, the wasted-vote strategy should apply to all minor-party supporters. They would
waste their vote if they cast a candidate vote for their most preferred candidate because
minor-party candidates are not likely to win a district race. Conversely, it is unreasonable
to expect a major-party supporter to employ the coalition insurance strategy and cast
a coalition vote for a minor party that has no chance of overcoming the 5% threshold.
Thus, why should minority party supporters try to avoid wasting their vote if their party
gets nothing out of it? They might be better o casting a straight ticket, thereby sending
an issue or protest message to the established parties in parliament. Thus, I expect that
both strategies should only be compelling for voters to support viable coalitions of parties.
Undoubtedly, at least for the last elections, it is reasonable to consider a priori only two
dierent two-party coalitions, namely a CDU/FDP and a SPD/Green coalition.
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Another aspect deals with the application of my theory to the states of the former East
Germany. While the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the ruling party in the former
GDR, is practically non-existent in West Germany but very strong in East Germany. The
East German party system is therefore still in ux. Only three federal elections have been
held since the fall of the Berlin Wall. There are no established coalition patterns involving
the PDS as of yet. Nevertheless, for the other four parties, the logic for strategic voting
also applies to East Germany. Summing up, I do not bias my results by looking only ata
priori dened coalition constellations in order to conceptualize strategic voting.
What follows is a formulation of eight hypotheses. The rst three hypotheses deal primarily
with the specic impact of electoral rules on a voter's behavior. The remaining hypotheses
acknowledge the fact that, contrary to what was previously thought, the impact of voting
rules are not the same for every voter.
In my rst hypothesis I seek to establish whether strategic ticket-splitting really matters
substantively. Assuming the reasoning about strategic voting is correct, to what extent
do strategic considerations enter into voters' decision calculus? Since the list-vote shares
determine whether a party is represented in parliament, strategic voting should improve the
success of minor-parties if it matters substantively. I expect that strategic ticket-splitters
should systematically contribute to the success of these parties across electoral districts.
Apart from the size of the loyal base of a party, the number of straight-ticket voters, I
expect that the success of minority parties such as the FDP or the Greens depends on
the number of strategic ticket-splitters across districts. The following hypothesis formally
states this expectation.
Hypothesis 1 (Minor-Party Success) The list-vote shares of a minor party in a district
depend on the number of strategic ticket-splitters in that district. The more strategic
ticket-splitters there are, the higher the list-vote shares of the FDP and the Greens.
The second hypothesis deals with the strategy surrounding the candidate vote. Here, plu-
rality rule provides the key incentive. From the literature on electoral institutions discussed
in section 2.2, it is known that under plurality rule, the wasted-vote strategy is the mech-
anism behind strategic voting. According to my theory, this strategy should only apply to
small-party supporters in mixed electoral systems. Stated succinctly, in a close race, small-
party supporters should be more inclined to avoid wasting their candidate vote because
they are more likely to make a dierence than in a non-competitive district race. Hence,
the incentive for small-party supporters to actually cast an ordinary strategic vote depends
on the closeness of the district race. I expect to nd more ordinary strategic voters if the
district race is close than if the district race is essentially a foregone conclusion. Thus my
second hypothesis is as follows.
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Hypothesis 2 (Wasted Vote) The closer the district race, the more likely voters are to
follow the wasted-vote strategy and cast an ordinary strategic vote.
The third hypothesis addresses strategic voting with the list vote. This strategy diers
from the previous one in that here, it is electoral rules that provide voters with another
rationale to vote strategically. List-vote shares are aggregated on the national level. The
competitiveness of the district race should have no impact on voters employing the coalition
insurance strategy on the list vote.
According to my theory, coalition voters are major-party supporters. They decide whether
it is more eective to cast a coalition vote for the smaller coalition partner of their most
preferred coalition or to simply cast a straight ticket for their most preferred party. It is pre-
sumably more eective to cast a coalition vote if major-party supporters are unsure whether
the small coalition partner can overcome the national threshold. However, if major-party
supporters expect that the smaller coalition partner will not overcome this threshold they
would rather cast a sincere straight ticket. Likewise, if major-party supporters are abso-
lutely certain that the smaller coalition partner will overcome the national threshold the
incentive to cast a coalition vote should also rapidly disappear. These voters would cast a
straight ticket as well. Thus, in general, the likelihood to cast a coalition vote should be
curvilinear and highest if voters expect to be pivotal, that is if she expects that her vote is
essential for the small coalition partner to garner just enough list votes to make it above
the threshold. The incentives to follow the coalition insurance hypothesis are lowest for
the two conditions described above, either if voters are certain that the party will make it
or, on the contrary, if voters are certain that the party will not make it above the national
threshold. Hence, my third hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 3 (Coalition Insurance) The more uncertain voters' expectations are whether
or not the smaller coalition partner can overcome the national threshold, the more likely
they are to follow the coalition insurance strategy and cast a coalition vote.
The rst three hypotheses deal with the impact of electoral rules on how voters behave
at the polls. According to my theory, strategic voters split their ticket in the directions
hypothesized above. Non-strategic voters cast either a straight ticket or split their ticket
in a non-strategic way. The literature, however, lumps together all ticket-splitters into
one group. Scholars focus solely on the attitudinal and demographic dierences between
ticket-splitters and straight-ticket voters, what I call the loyal base. This is certainly an
oversimplication of the ticket-splitting phenomenon. There might be a variety of reasons
why voters split their tickets. I do not expect this group to be homogeneous. Instead, I will
disentangle this category into its constituent groups: strategic ticket-splitters employing
one of two strategies, and non-strategic ticket-splitters.
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Electoral institutions provide certain incentives. Whether or not these incentives are strong
enough to encourage a voter to deviate from her preferred choice, employing either the
wasted-vote or the coalition insurance strategy, is likely to dier from voter to voter. Some
voters are more likely to cast a strategic vote because they have a higherproclivity to vote
strategically. I will argue that the factors responsible for thisproclivity depend on at least
two factors: the motivation to cast a strategic vote and the capability to understand the
strategic implications of the electoral rules and the nature of the party system. Just the
preference of certain parties or coalitions should be enough to motivate a voter to cast a
strategic vote in a particular fashion. I wish to extrapolate four motivational hypotheses
based on this observation.
According to my theory, a certain party preference order motivates voters in a particular
fashion to cast a strategic vote. The fourth hypothesis is that small-party supporters, like
supporters of the FDP and the Greens, are more motivated to employ the wasted-vote
strategy and cast an ordinary strategic vote than other party supporters. They essentially
know that their local party representative will not win the district race. Furthermore, major-
party supporters, like supporters of the CDU and the SPD, are more motivated than others
to employ the coalition vote strategy because they also know, that their party will not gain
a majority of the seats in parliament without the help of a smaller coalition partner. Hence
the fth hypotheses is that they are more likely to cast a coalition vote than to split their
ticket in some other, non-strategic way.
Both my sixth and seventh hypotheses deal with the strength of a voter's partisanship as a
motivational factor. From the literature on strategic voting and ticket-splitting in political
behavior, we know more about motivational dierences that might explain whether voters
cast a straight ticket, split their ticket or cast a strategic vote. The standard nding is that
voters who split their ticket have weaker partisan attachments than straight-ticket voters.
In concordance with this literature, my sixth hypothesis is that the stronger someone's
partisanship is, the more likely she is to cast a straight-ticket vote.
However, strategic ticket-splitting is a special type of ticket-splitting. In mixed electoral
systems, a government depends on the support of more than just one party. Thewasted-
vote strategy provides a rationale for minor-party supporters to deviate from their most
preferred candidate, whereas the coalition insurance strategy provides a rationale for major-
party supporters to deviate from their most preferred party. In both cases, strategic voters
support their most preferred coalition by strategically splitting their tickets instead. Both
rationales indirectly support a strategic voter's most preferred party. Presumably, strategic
voting is, therefore, a more partisan act than simply splitting the ticket in some other fash-
ion. My eighth hypothesis is that, if strong partisans split their ticket, they are more likely
to split it strategically than non-strategically. In brief, the implications of the motivational
factors, such as partisanship and the its extremity, leading to a strategic vote are summed
up in hypotheses 4 through 7.
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Hypotheses 4 - 7 (Motivation)
4) FDP and Green supporters are more likely to cast an ordinary strategic vote than to
split their ticket non-strategically.
5) CDU and SPD supporters are more likely to cast a coalition vote than to split their
ticket non-strategically.
6) The stronger a voter's partisanship, the more inclined she is to cast a straight ticket.
7) The stronger a ticket-splitter's partisanship, the more likely she is to split her ticket
strategically.
The remaining factor that determines a voter's proclivity to vote strategically is her ca-
pability to understand the implications of her choices. Besides motivation, theproclivity
to vote strategically depends on the voter's capability to engage in a task so cognitive in
nature. Even if voters are non-partisans, such that they do not feel motivated to vote
strategically to the same degree as partisans, they might \rationally" calculate that in
order to support a certain government, one way to cast their votes is more ecient than
other ways. Voters have to be politically aware (Zaller, 1992; Zaller and Feldman, 1992)
and sophisticated (Luskin, 1987) enough to comprehend (Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988)
various options that the electoral rules oer them. Thus, my eighth hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 8 (Capability) The higher a voter's level of political awareness, the more likely
she will be to cast a strategic vote.
The following section lays out how I will go about testing the hypotheses enumerated
above. Two interrelated questions are at the center of the following section: What models
must I estimate in order to test my hypotheses, and what are the data requirements for
doing so?
3.3 Methods and Data
The hypotheses presented here speak to dierent levels of analysis. From the discussion
of the electoral rules, it is reasonable to expect that the intensity of strategic voting varies
across electoral districts, since the incentives to vote strategically likewise vary across
districts. The test of the Minor-Party Success Hypothesis with aggregate-level data is
a rst step toward establishing whether my theory about strategic voting is reasonable,
and facilitates an assessment of the political consequences of strategic voting. According
to my theory, the list-vote shares of the FDP and the Greens consist of three dierent
groups. The rst is that of the party's loyal base, the straight-ticket voters for the FDP
and the Greens, respectively. The second group consists of ordinary strategic voters, who
cast strategically their candidate votes and vote sincerely with their list vote. The third
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group consists of coalition voters, who strategically cast their list vote but cast a sincere
candidate vote. Since ordinary strategic voters and coalition voters exhibit the same voting
patterns, they cannot be distinguished with aggregate-level data. This can only be achieved
with the individual-level data.
In the following sections I will rst discuss how I am going test my rst hypothesis, the
Minor-Party Success Hypothesis, on the aggregate level. In the second part I will focus on
how I go about testing the remaining hypotheses and how to distinguish dierent strategic
from non-strategic behavior at the individual level.
3.3.1 Test on the Aggregate Level
Evidently, strategic voting is an individual-level phenomenon. To test it with aggregate
data, I employ a relatively new statistical model, Gary King's Ecological Inference (King,
1997). Ecological Inference (EI) is the process of using aggregate data to draw inferences
about individual-level behavior. Since the lack of individual-level information causes prob-
lems for cross-level inferences, what is widely known as \ecological fallacy", no attempt
to solve this problem will always produce accurate results. Compared to other approaches,
however6, King's solution has at least three advantages: It includesa priori more informa-
tion in the model-building process, uses several diagnostic procedures to check underlying
assumptions of the model, and allows for rening these assumptions.7 Therefore, King's
EI approach minimizes potential diculties, and thus generates more realistic estimates for
the unobserved individual-level relationships of interest.8
According to my conceptualization, I use EzI in the rst stage of my analysis to estimate
the size of the loyal base, FDP or Green straight-ticket voters, separately for both parties
in every electoral district.9 In order to test the Minor-Party Success Hypotheses, I need
estimates for strategic ticket-splitters as well. Thus, I also estimate the number of strategic
voters in every district, ordinary strategic and coalition voters together, who vote for the
CDU (or SPD) representative with their candidate vote and for the FDP (or the Greens)
with their list vote.
6) Achen and Shively (1995) provide a nice overview.
7) See Voss and Lublin (1998) for an attempt to provide the intuition behind these assumptions
8) For the analysis of amount and direction of split-ticket voting, I use EzI (Version 2.23), writ-
ten by Kenneth Benoit and Gary King, which is publicly available on King's homepage at
http://Gking.harvard.edu.
9) Burden and Kimball (1998) use a similar research design.
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The data used for this analysis is provided by the Federal Statistical Oce of Germany. It
contains ocial election results of candidate and list votes for all German districts from
the 1998 federal election. Since the political landscapes in two former states, East and
West Germany, are very dierent, I will estimate each separately. Table 3.1 illustrates the
EI-estimates of interest.
Table 3.1: Ecological Inference Problem.
Straight Ticket Estimation Party A's List Votes not Party A's List Votes
Party A's Candidate Vote ﬀi 1  ﬀi A1i
not Party A's Candidate Vote ﬀni 1  ﬀni 1  A1i
A2i 1  A2i
Ticket Splitting Estimation Party A's List Votes not Party A's List Votes
Party B's Candidate Vote ﬁi 1  ﬁi B1i
not Party B's Candidate Vote ﬁni 1  ﬁni 1 B1i
A2i 1  A2i
The ecological inference problem must be reduced such that only two cell values of a 22-
table are estimated for every district from the distribution of the known marginal values in
order to apply EI.10 Generally, the true values of the quantities of interest ﬁi and ﬁni , the
ticket-splitting estimates in district i , are somewhere within the [0,1]-square. Fortunately,
there are more restrictions to that. Information about the marginal distribution, the ab-
solute number of candidate votes (B1i for CDU or SPD candidates) and list votes (A2i
for FDP or the Greens) can be employed to narrow down the space where the true values
lie. Obviously, there cannot be more strategic ticket-splitters than candidate or list votes
for that party in a particular district. ObservingA1i and B2i , the quantities of interest are
deterministically related (without measurement error) by the following accounting identity:
B2i = ﬁi  A1i + ﬁni  (1  A1i) (3.1)
10) Since the absolute number of valid candidate and list votes is never the same in a district, I imported
the number of candidate votes for a particular party ( ~A1i ) weighted by a ratio of the valid list (N2i )
and valid candidate votes (N1i ) in that district. Thus, A1i = ~A1i  N2iN1i . The same number of votes for
candidate and list votes in a district is a necessary data requirement for usingEzI.
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Rearranging the above equation, the true quantities of interest dene a point somewhere
on the following line.
ﬁni =
(
B2i
1  A1i
)
 
(
A1i
1  A1i
)
ﬁi (3.2)
Since A1i is always positive, the slope coecient in the equation of the above line is always
negative. Moreover, from this linear relationship one gets more information about the
spread of all ﬁi 's and all ﬁni 's, respectively. Since there is a unique line for every district
\i",both the slope and the intercept of this line will vary only within a xed interval.
Therefore, one can obtain deterministic bounds in which the true values of the quantities
of interest must lie.11
The basic assumption of King's EI is that the quantities of interest are normally distributed
within their bounds, hence (ﬁi , ﬁni ) is distributed truncated bivariate normally (TBN).
Specically, this assumption means that the quantities of interest are not constant but still
have something in common. The TBN distribution has a single mode, indicating where
the most values (ﬁi , ﬁni ) fall. The ve parameters of this joint distribution - two means,
two variances and a covariance - are nally estimated by maximum likelihood. To obtain
the estimates for the quantities of interest in every district, I take the point on the line
described by equation 3.2 for each district which is closest to the estimated mode of the
TBN, since the true value is most likely to lie at this point.12
King's EI is not uncontested (Freedman et al., 1998, 1999; Herron and Shotts, 2003; King,
1999; McCue, 2001; Rivers, 1999; Tam, 1998). The main critiques in this vein focus mainly
on two other assumptions. EI assumes, for instance, that the estimated parameters ( ^ﬁi ,
ﬁ^i n or ﬀ^i , ﬀ^i n) do not correlate with the marginal valuesA1i , i.e., there is no \aggregation
bias". Cho (1998) shows via Monte Carlo simulations that EI estimates are inconsistent
in the face of aggregation bias. Moreover, EI assumes that there is no spatial correlation
in the data. This assumption is, of course, criticized by political geographers (Anselin
and Cho, 2002; O'Loughlin, 2000), who try to explain spatial contiguity. The discussion
boils down to a question of how robust EI is in the face of violations of its underlying
assumptions. One simple diagnostic tool is the tomography plot. The following gure 3.5
presents one of these plots for the ticket-splitter between the CDU and the FDP in West
Germany.
11) The same logic applies to the model for straight tickets (ﬀi and ﬀni ) if B2i is replaced by A2i .
12) Moreover, if one wishes to estimate more ticket-splitting patterns, one must divide the estimation
process into several steps, such that the quantities of interest can be estimated successively by reducing
the problem into 2  2-tables. However, this implies that the Variance-Covariance Matrix of the
underlying truncated normal distribution is blockwise diagonal. This feature works only if we assume
that the errors of estimating two dierent 2 2-tables are uncorrelated. A better way to estimate
R  C-type models such as these has recently been developed (Rosen et al., 2001; de Mattos and
Alvaro Veiga, 2001).
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Figure 3.5: Tomography Plot of CDU-FDP Ticket Splitter.
It can be clearly seen that the dierent intercepts of the lines fall within a very narrow
interval. This information helps the estimation process a great deal. The additional infor-
mation gained by restricting the possible parameter space is enormous and, fortunately for
this analysis, seems to be one of the major characteristics of my data.
Employing EI point estimates derived from the rst stage as dependent or independent
variables in a second-stage analysis is not straightforward, and just recently drew more
attention (Lewis, 2000; Herron and Shotts, 2003). Herron and Shotts are especially critical
of this strategy, and remind us that EI-based point estimates of district level quantities ^ﬁi
and ﬁ^i n are inconsistent. This will be less of a problem, as they show, if the predicted
values ﬁ^i and ﬁ^i n are very accurate. There is no direct way to assess the accuracy of the
district-level estimates, for if we could observe this accuracy, there would be no need to
employ some version of an ecological inference technique in the rst place. Nevertheless,
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the best case scenario for very accurate predictions is when the deterministic bounds are
very informative - that is, very tight. Since the estimates must lie within these bounds,
and if these bounds are very tight, the residuals of the predicted values cannot be large.
Fortunately, as it can be seen from the above tomography plot, the list-vote shares of the
FDP (and the Greens) do not vary much. The verication of my results with survey data
will provide an answer to whether these bounds are indeed tight enough.
There is another point worth noting. Treating EI point estimates simply as dependent or
independent variables does not account for the uncertainty that every prediction entails.
Since these point estimates are not observations, they should not be treated as such. Thus,
in order to account for the uncertainty in the EI point estimates, I use a multiple imputation
strategy, which is introduced to a political science audience by King et al. (2001). Instead of
imputing values for missing data, I run several simulations. In fact I run sixEzI simulations
and create six data sets. I then run my second-stage model, predicting the list-vote shares
of the FDP and the Greens, with independent variables based on EI point estimates for
every data set. The resulting multiple imputation point estimates are the averages across
the coecients of these six separately estimated models. The appropriate standard errors
are derived from the variance of the point estimates. The variance of the resulting multiple
imputation point estimates is simply the average of the estimated variances within each of
the six data sets, plus the simulated sample variance in the point estimates across all data
sets. The estimated \across-variance" has to be corrected for bias by a factor (1 + 1=6)
since this estimate is only asymptotically unbiased, but I employ merely six simulations (see
equation 3 in King et al. (2001)). The main crux of this design is that the simulated sample
variance is added to the average of the estimated \within-variance". Thus, the estimated
variance of the resulting multiple imputation point estimates gets wider, accounting for the
uncertainty in my independent variables since they are based on EI point estimates and not
on observations.
In order to test my rst hypothesis, the Minor-Party Success Hypothesis, I run OLS re-
gressions with the list-vote shares for the FDP and the Greens as dependent variables and
EI-estimates for the loyal base (ﬀ^i) and for strategic ticket-splitters (ﬁ^i) as the indepen-
dent variables. Moreover, I will validate these EI predictions with individual-level data from
post-election surveys. I cannot, however, disentangle ordinary strategic voters and coalition
voters without applying strong assumptions. With district-level data, these two groups of
strategic voters are observationally equivalent.
The very same fact also makes a direct test of theWasted-Vote Hypothesis impossible with
aggregate-level data. The group of strategic ticket-splitters consists of coalition voters and
ordinary strategic voters. While the number of ordinary strategic voters should depend on
the closeness of the district race, as should the number of strategic ticket-splitters, the
group of coalition voters should not. We need a further assumption in order to identify
ordinary strategic voters and coalition voters separately with aggregate data.
One must also be creative in order to test theCoalition Insurance Hypothesis. Since the 5%
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threshold does not apply to the states, but does to the national level, I cannot use variations
of coalition votes across to get some mileage here. The only way to test this hypothesis
with aggregate-level data is across several elections. However, the same problem occurs
as before: How can I get an estimate for the number of coalition voters? To construct
a dependent variable I could take the number of strategic ticket-splitters in an election
as published in the representative electoral statistics (reprasentative Wahlstatistik13). To
decide whether the FDP or the Greens are actually seen as being close to the 5% threshold,
one could use \vote intention" marginals of pre-election polls as an independent variable.
The diculty associated with this approach, of course, is to get these polls for all 12 federal
elections in order to have enough degrees-of freedom for a regression analysis. Obviously, I
could only use data from West Germany. Also, since the Greens are a relatively new party,
the analysis must exclude this party, and instead focus only on the FDP. I could also control
for the absolute number of ticket-splitters in order to make sure that this relationship does
not depend on a general rise of ticket-splitting, signaling times of dealignment. Thus,
it seems that the more direct way to test these hypotheses is with individual-level data
instead.
3.3.2 Test on the Individual Level
All remaining hypotheses should be tested simultaneously. In order to do so, I will rst
employ a dependent variable with three categories in order to distinguish ordinary non-
strategic ticket-splitters from strategic voters, while accounting for factors related to sin-
cere straight-ticket voting and controlling for alternative explanations. I will also disentangle
coalition voters from ordinary strategic voters, depending on whether they most prefer the
smaller or the bigger coalition partner. This would result in a dependent variable with four
categories. To estimate a three- or even a four-choice model, I shall estimate a multino-
mial logit model (MNL). This model yield only consistent estimates if theindependence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption holds in the data. Since the probability of casting a
straight ticket should theoretically be unchanged if one of the other categories is removed,
the IIA assumption should not be violated. Nevertheless, I will test for that.
Since individual-level models of strategic voting (Alvarez and Nagler, 2000) typically create
a model of sincere voting, and include some measures indicating varying degrees of incen-
tives to deviate from the sincere baseline behavior, they only test whether voters are more
13) The reprasentative Wahlstatistik is unique to the German political system. Beginning with the second
federal election in 1953, the German Federal Statistical Bureau administered a stratied sample of
precincts, the lowest possible unit of analysis, and marks the ballots according to gender and age. One
thus gets a representative sample of eligible voters and has information about the actual split-ticket
behavior, as well as the distribution across age groups and gender. Unfortunately, the published results
are aggregated on the state level. Data collection was suspended, however, for the 1994 and 1998
elections. Otherwise, this data could be used for validation attempts. A well-executed study also
employing this kind of data is provided by Schoen (1999b).
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likely to deviate from their most preferred party under certain conditions. My approach is
superior because it also predicts the direction of strategic votes. Where do these voters
depart from, and for whom do they vote for instead? My conceptualization of strategic
voting also allows for a more rened test of sincere straight-ticket voting, strategic ticket-
splitting and non-strategic ticket-splitting. I will use the 1998 German National Election
Study (German NES) to test my individual-level hypotheses. All Motivation Hypotheses
and the Capability Hypothesis must be tested on the individual level. I will construct typical
measures for a voter's level of strength of partisanship and awareness.
To test the Wasted-Vote Hypothesis with individual-level data, I impute the actual district
margins from ocial election returns. The closer the margin, the more likely a small-party
supporter is to cast an ordinary strategic vote. The Coalition Insurance Hypothesis can
be tested with individual-level data because respondents have dierent expectations about
the possibility that the FDP or the Greens do not surpass the national threshold of 5%. A
question concerning the closeness to 5% is not available in 1998 German NES, however. I
will impute appropriate values from dierent data sources. There is a pre-election survey
in 1998 that asks respondents about their expectations, rated on a four-point scale, of
whether the FDP or the Greens will overcome the 5% threshold.
The \personal vote" (Cain et al., 1987) is an alternative explanation I also plan to control
for. Personal voters are sincere ticket-splitters. They vote for their preferred candidate
but do not support their candidate's party. No strategic reasoning is involved here. In
order to distinguish such voters empirically from ordinary strategic voters, I would expect
that personal voters know at least the name of the candidate they vote for. Ordinary
strategic voters do not necessarily have to focus on the personality and the name of the
local candidate. Their strategy short-circuits that.
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Chapter 4
Iterative EI Estimation and Its Internal Consistency
Problem
The publication of King's \A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem" in 1997 has
received recognition that is quite extraordinary for a social science project, much less a
book in the eld of political methodology. While the New York Times and the Boston
Globe have waxed on about his solution of an old problem in social science, many scholars
in statistics (Freedman et al., 1998, 1999; McCue, 2001), political geography (Anselin
and Cho, 2002; O'Loughlin, 2000) and political methodology (Herron and Shotts, 2003;
Rivers, 1999; Tam, 1998) have taken issue with King's model, particularly its assumptions
and the robustness of EI estimates. The bottom line of this discussion in various elds
seems to be that, for one, the formulation of the model's assumptions are to a large extent
a matter of taste, and second, that King's model is indeed not the solution but (as is
clearly stated in the title of his book) a solution to this problem. Authors might object to
- and hence like to rene - some assumptions he made. Arguably, however, no one wishes
to restrict progress on this issue. Furthermore, King's EI has a very practical advantage
for substantive research: He provides free and easy-to-use software to run these kinds of
models. That said, however, there is one \real" issue here that is often been overlooked in
substantive applications of King's model. I will call this EI's internal consistency problem.
In this chapter I seek to elaborate on this problem, because it potentially undermines every
inference based on EI estimates, even if all of the requisite assumptions are met.1
In a two-ballot system such as mixed electoral systems, the district-level result of candidate
and list vote distributions can be represented in aR  C contingency table, whereas the
vote shares of R elded candidates are represented by the marginal Rows values and the
shares of C party lists are represented, consequently, by the marginal value in every Column.
Scholars of strategic voting, according to my theory, are interested in values of particular
inner cells of a contingency table such as this one, because it indicates how many voters
1) Parts of this chapter are meanwhile published in German (Gschwend, 2003).
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split their ticket between a particular candidate and a certain party list in every district.
Since these values are represented by parameters, they are called \parameter of interest".
These parameters of interest are generally unobserved, and hence must be estimated.
Ideally, in assessing dierent ticket-splitting patterns, one would like to estimate all inner
cells of a R  C-table. The size of these tables is not constant, because the number of
candidates or parties varies across districts. The typical strategy, therefore, is for scholars
to reduce the dimension of rows and columns, i.e., to collapse various categories such that
every table has the same number of candidates and parties. This technique also facilitates
a comparison of these contingency tables across districts. Even if I restrict my attention to
the theoretically relevant parties, with the data at hand the row and column variables would
have 5 categories (CDU, SPD, FDP, Greens and \Other Parties"), forming a 5 5-table.
To simultaneously estimate an R  C-table such as this is a burgeoning, young area of
inquiry for statisticians as well as political methodologists (Rosen et al., 2001; de Mattos
and Alvaro Veiga, 2001). These models are very sophisticated and consume quite some
computer power. For the time being, one must collapse categories successively to reduce
the problem to a 2 2-table, and thus apply King's model.
Since EI is essentially a \seemingly unrelated regression" (SUR) model this might not be a
problem at all if the distributions of the categories across districts that get collapsed do not
covary. This is not generally the case, though. Ferree (2004) shows that lumping together
dierent categories might violate underlying EI assumptions. Even if the original data fullls
the EI data requirements, the parameters of interest of the reduced 2 2-table are not
necessarily (truncated) normally distributed. Thus, collapsing categories might introduce
aggregation bias. Previous applications of EI that are published in the foremost political
science journals (Burden and Kimball, 1998; Cho and Gaines, 2004) do not address this
problem.
As I set forth in the previous chapter, I will also follow the strategy to collapse categories
such that the estimation problem is reduced to a 2 2-table. The question the researcher
must address is therefore, to what degree does this strategy yield the same estimates as a
simultaneous estimation of the corresponding 55-table? This is a hypothetical question,
of course, for if it were a straightforward estimation, no one would ever consider collapsing
the categories. Nevertheless, scholars with substantive interests facing ecological inference
problems have to deal with this issue. To estimate the parameters of interest iteratively is
certainly not the most ecient way of getting an understanding of what is going on in the
data as a consequence of collapsing categories. Thus I estimate, iteratively, the shares of
CDU, SPD, FDP, Green and candidate voters for candidates of other parties who cast their
list vote for the FDP. The same procedure is employed for the Greens. For every party in
every district I obtain ve values. Given the data, EI yields internally consistent estimates
to the degree to which the sum of these iteratively estimated cells equals the observed list
vote shares of the FDP and the Greens, respectively. One can have more condence in
estimates derived from 2 2-tables, as I will undertake, if this iterative procedure yields
internally consistent results.
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In the remaining part of this chapter I will provide an empirical justication of my research
design. I will provide evidence that iteratively computed EI estimates are internally consis-
tent. This implies that my strategy to reducea priori the estimation problem in theoretically
meaningful 2 2 -tables yields consistent estimates of the parameter of interest - at least
given the characteristics of my data. Again, previous work that employed EI (Burden and
Kimball, 1998; Cho and Gaines, 2004) has not explicitly provided such an comprehensive
assessment of the sensitivity of EI estimates.
Some preliminary remarks are in order before I address the validity of the EI estimates.
As with every estimation, substantive knowledge of the problem might help to eliminate
the greatest pitfalls. Moreover, one has to think hard about the nature of the underlying
data-generating process. Two points are worth noting here. First, one of the real strengths
of King's model is that it includes deterministic information about the possible ranges of
the parameters of interest in the estimation process. For instance, there cannot be more
strategic ticket-splitters than list votes for a party. Since the list vote shares for the Greens
and the FDP fall within a very narrow interval (because, after all, these are minor parties),
the parameters of interest can only vary within a small range. The inclusion of this type
of deterministic information in the model makes the estimation process much easier and is
likely to produce more precise estimates. Most importantly, even massive violations of the
underlying assumptions of King's EI can only have weak impact on the estimates because
these assumptions are solely needed to shrink the already narrow (deterministic) bounds in
which the estimated parameters can possibly vary.
The second point concerning the underlying data-generating process relies on the nature of
party competition in Germany. Party competition diers greatly in East and West Germany.
The Greens as well as the FDP are more successful in the West while the PDS is a major
force only in the East. In order to reduce spatial correlation and possible aggregation bias,
I divide the data into two parts and estimate all models separately for East and West. This
also makes the remaining assumption of EI - unimodal distribution of the parameters of
interest - imminently more plausible.
Besides these substantive measures of precaution, I will take two more technical steps
to assure that EI yields reasonable estimates in the rst stage of my analysis. First, I
will run several internal consistency checks to ensure that despite the simplication of
the estimation problem, EI produces the same parameters of interest if one would instead
estimate the more general R  C-problem. Second, I will focus on the estimation of the
parameters of interest and employ visual diagnostic tools and post-estimation tests for
aggregation bias.
As stated in my theory, I am only interested in the columns representing list votes of the
FDP and the Greens in a hypothetical 5 5-table. Ideally, I would like to estimate the ve
inner cells in these columns simultaneously to get estimates of the fraction of candidate
voters of a particular party (CDU, SPD, FDP, Green and \Other") who cast a list vote
for the FDP and the Greens, respectively. Since this is not yet tractable, I iteratively run
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ve EI's. Each time, I collapse four dierent rows to reduce the problem into a 22-table
and estimate the fth cell representing the fraction of candidate voters of the fth party
candidate who cast a list vote for the FDP and the Greens, respectively. Thus, after every
step, I ll in one of the ve inner cells in the columns of the FDP and the Greens. If
such an iterative procedure yields internally consistent results, however, we can have more
condence in EI estimates derived from a simplication of the problem to a 2 2-table.
Let ﬁPFi denote the estimated fraction of candidate voters for the local candidate of party
\P" in district \i" who cast a list vote for the FDP.2 Consequently, to obtain the shares
of FDP list voters with this splitting behavior, ﬁPFi must be multiplied by Party1i , the
candidate vote share of party \P" in that district. \P" stands for either the CDU, SPD,
FDP, the Greens or the PDS, which is combined with votes of the Other candidates in
a district. Analogously, the same procedure is done to obtain estimates of the shares of
Green list voters who cast their candidate vote for the candidate of party \P". I will
estimate 5 (number of party candidates considered) 2 (East, West)  2 (FDP, Greens)
separate EI's.
One way to see whether the reduction of the estimation problem yields internally consistent
estimates is to simply add up the ve estimated shares of FDP (or the Green) list voters
with a particular splitting behavior. One would like to see whether they are statistically
dierent from the ocial list vote shares of the FDP (or the Greens) across districts.
Hence, I derive the estimated list vote share of the FDP (or the Greens) by summing up
ve estimated shares from iterative EI estimations as follows:
\FDP2i = ﬁCFi  CDU1i + ﬁSFi  SPD1i + ﬁGFi  Green1i + ﬁFFi  FDP1i + ﬁOFi Other1i (4.1)
whereas Other1i = 1  (CDU1i + SPD1i + Green1i + FDP1i). A similar equation with
dierent parameters can be obtained analogously in order to estimate the list vote shares
of the Greens as the sum of ve groups of Green list voters with these types of splitting
behavior. Every EI point estimate is also accompanied by a standard error to assess the
precision of the estimation.
Summing up all ve sets of point estimates also require summing up the uncertainty mea-
sures, in order to construct a valid 95% condence interval around the estimated list vote
shares of the FDP and the Greens, respectively, as a sum of ve estimates. Reducing
the problem to a 2 2-table to make it more tractable does yield internally consistent
estimates, if the estimated values are not dierent from the actual values.
Thus, a plot of the estimated list vote shares on the ocial list vote shares across districts
should visualize the degree to which this iterative procedure introduces bias in the estima-
tion. Figure 4.1 shows the 95% condence intervals of the estimated list vote shares for
2) Although the ﬁ 's are estimated, I drop the \hat" to simplify notation.
50 Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistik und Wissenschaft, Bd. 2/2004
Iterative EI Estimation and Its Internal Consistency Problem
the FDP for every district. An estimated district level value for FDP or Green list vote
shares is not signicantly dierent from the ocial result if the 95% condence interval
crosses the 45-degree line. This indicates that the estimated district level values and the
ocial results in the district are not dierent.
Figure 4.1: Internal Consistency Check of iterated EI Estimations for FDP List-Vote
Shares.
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Clearly, the list vote shares of the FDP vary only within a narrow interval. This party
does not get more than 15% in a district. Almost every condence interval intercepts the
45-degree line, although it seems that the estimates exert a small upward bias. Obviously,
this procedure is not very ecient, since the condence intervals are relatively large. It
might be not advisable to just ll in all inner cells of a higher dimensional contingency
table with estimated values for the ﬁ 's derived from iterative generated 2 2-tables. But
this is not the goal, of course. Instead, this gure provides evidence that, in fact, we can
have condence in EI predictions derived from the theoretically motivated reduction of the
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general problem, the R  C-case, in to a 2 2-table. Figure 4.2 shows a similar picture
for the Greens.
Figure 4.2: Internal Consistency Check of iterated EI Estimations for Green List-Vote
Shares.
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The list vote shares of the Greens vary a bit more than the ones of the FDP across
districts, although compared to that they could theoretically vary between 0 and 100%,
they still cover only a much more narrower range. This is information that is been used
in the estimation process of EI. Moreover, the estimated district values as a sum of ve
point estimates also seem to overestimate the actual result a little bit. This indicates that
collapsing categories introduces a slightly positive aggregation bias. Nevertheless, in most
districts the condence intervals intercept the 45-degree line indicating that the estimated
list vote shares of the Greens are statistically indistinguishable from the ocial count.
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The results I draw from the above gures for the FDP and the Greens are quite comforting.
Although collapsing categories seem to overestimate the district-level estimates slightly,
this type of bias is modest at best, since in most districts the ocial and the estimated
results are statistically indistinguishable. This is the rst step to assure that ana priori
reduction of the estimation problem yields reasonable estimates.
Another way to assess the internal consistency, following King's suggestion (King, 1997,
chapter 15.1), is to generalize the accounting identity of the 22 case - whereby A1 is the
candidate vote share of party A and B2 denotes the list vote shares of PartyB, ﬁABi ; ﬁ
AB
i
are the parameter of interest in district \i" and
B2i = ﬁABi  A1i + ﬁnABi  (1  A1i) (4.2)
One then derives several equations to compute parameters of interest based on the ac-
counting identity for ve parties in equation 4.1. Since 5 5-tables are not an option, I
have to collapse categories to estimate the inner cells of a 2 2 table. For instance, to
estimate the share of strategic ticket-splitters, i.e. the fraction (ﬁCFi ) of CDU candidate
voters in a district (CDU1i) casting their list vote for the FDP, equation 4.1 simplies as
follows:
FDP2i = ﬁCFi  CDU1i + ﬁnCFi  (1  CDU1i ) whereas (4.3)
ﬁnCFi  (1  CDUi ) = ﬁSFi  SPD1i + ﬁGFi  Green1i + ﬁFFi  FDP1i + ﬁOFi Other1i (4.4)
In this run of EI, I estimate ﬁCFi and ﬁ
nCF
i , the fraction of CDU candidate voters who
cast a list vote for the FDP as well as non-CDU candidate voters in a district casting
their list vote for the FDP. The remaining four unobserved parameters in equation 4.1
- ﬁSFi ; ﬁ
GF
i ; ﬁ
FF
i ; ﬁ
OF
i - are analogously estimated in successive runs of EI in which four
other categories are collapsed together. Thus every quantity of interest can be calculated
deterministically in ve dierent ways.
Take, for instance, the number of FDP straight-ticket voters ﬁFFi  FDP1i . If all four
appropriate 2 2 tables are estimated, then equation 4.1 can be rearranged to yield
ﬁFFi  FDP1i = FDP2  ﬁCFi  CDU1i   ﬁSFi  SPD1i   ﬁGFi  Green1i   ﬁOFi Other1i (4.5)
Note that all terms on the right-hand side are known. The same quantity can be calculated
after rearranging equation 4.4 as follows.
ﬁFFi  FDP1i = ﬁnCFi  (1  CDU1i )  ﬁSFi  SPD1i   ﬁGFi  Green1i   ﬁOFi Other1i (4.6)
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While ﬁnCFi is the second parameter of the EI run to estimate the fraction of CDU candidate
voters who cast their list vote for the FDP, ﬁSFi ; ﬁ
GF
i and ﬁ
OF
i are taken from separate
EI runs estimating the fraction of candidate voters of either the SPD, the Greens or the
candidate of another parties who cast a list vote for the FDP.
ﬁFFi  FDP1i = ﬁnSFi  (1  SPD1i )  ﬁCFi  CDU1i   ﬁGFi  Green1i   ﬁOFi Other1i (4.7)
= ﬁnGFi  (1  Green1i )  ﬁSFi  SPD1i   ﬁCFi  CDU1i   ﬁOFi Other1i (4.8)
= ﬁnOFi  (1 Other1i )  ﬁSFi  SPD1i   ﬁCFi  CDU1i   ﬁGFi  Green1i (4.9)
In summary, equations 4.5 to 4.9 represent ve dierent ways to calculate the same param-
eter of interest using ve iterative EI estimations. In a analysis not presented here, I calcu-
lated two dierent parameters for all ve equations (namelyﬁFFi FDP1i and ﬁOFi Other1i
as well as ﬁGGi Green1i and ﬁOGi Other1i) yielding nearly identical results up to two decimal
points. Hence, based on these internal consistency checks, I conclude that it is reasonable
- at least with the data at hand - to decompose the estimation process in several EI estima-
tions. Most importantly, however, this implies that I can have condence in my estimates
even if they are obtained by reducing the ecological inference problema priori into several
22 tables of theoretically relevant cells to construct measures to test my rst hypothesis,
the Minor-Party Success Hypothesis. This is only a rst step toward assuring that my EI
estimates are reasonable.
Since the iterative estimation of the parameter of interest is internally consistent, I focus
my diagnostic analysis on the substantively interesting parameter estimations. This are the
EI estimations to get on the one hand the fractions of CDU (or SPD) candidate voters
who cast a list vote for the FDP (or the Greens), and, on the other hand, the fraction
of FDP (or Green) candidate voters who cast a list vote for the FDP (or the Greens).
As a second step toward assuring that this estimation strategy is reasonable, I will employ
visual diagnostic tools and post-estimation tests for aggregation bias. A good way to
understand aggregation bias is to think about its substantive implications for the data at
hand. Aggregation bias only occurs with this data if a party's candidate vote shares are
correlated with the estimates of the inner cells, the parameters of interest. What does this
mean substantively? Suppose we observe that the Greens get many list votes in districts
where their candidate is also very successful. If aggregation bias is no issue, a rst scenario
would be that the more successful the district candidate of the Greens is, the more straight-
tickets there will be, and therefore the more list votes the party gets. This inference could
be heavily biased, however, because the observed candidate vote shares are presumably
strongly correlated with the estimated district-level shares of Green straight-ticket voters.
Instead, a second - and probably a more realistic - scenario would be that such strongholds
of the Greens, electoral districts where the party is able to gain many list votes, exist
independently of the success of their local candidate. For instance, it could instead turn
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out that such Green strongholds are in fact \manufactured" by disproportionately higher
numbers of voters who cast only their list vote for the Greens but cast their candidate vote
for the SPD candidate in the district. This inference would be substantively quite dierent
from the rst one noted above. Strongholds of the Greens could be independent from the
success of the Green party candidate on the candidate vote in these districts, but depend
on the number of strategic ticket-splitters in favor of the Greens. If this were the \real"
story, then the number of straight ticket voters would be overestimated. The estimates for
the number of straight-ticket voters across districts would be attenuated by aggregation
bias.
A straightforward ex post diagnostic procedure is to graph a scatter plot of the parameters
of interest by the respective candidate vote shares. The size of the slope of a hypothetical
regression line through the data points is a measure of the severity of aggregation bias of
a particular EI estimation.
Figure 4.3: A Visualized Aggregation Bias Check of the Parameter of Interest.
West German Dist r ic ts
t
a
u
^
F
F
FDP Candidate Vote Shares
0 .05 .1 .15
0
1
t
a
u
^
C
F
CDU Candidate Vote Shares
.2 .4 .6
0
1
t
a
u
^
G
G
Green Candidate Vote Shares
0 .1 .2 .3
0
1
t
a
u
^
S
G
SPD Candidate Vote Shares
.2 .4 .6 .8
0
1
Consequently, one wishes to see essentially horizontal lines as best tting regression lines.
Figure 4.3 shows such scatter plots presenting all four parameters of interest on the y-axes
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and the respective candidate-vote shares on the x-axes. To facilitate comparison, I scaled
all y-axes the same, while the x-axes vary according to the success of the party candidate
in the district which is obtained from the ocial election returns. Note that this gure is
based on the West German districts; however, the graphs representing East Germany look
essentially the same.
On rst inspection, no severe aggregation bias can be detected. The points in every graph
scatter around an essentially horizontal regression line. The hypothetical slope coecient
must be around zero, indicating that aggregation bias is not an issue here. Furthermore,
the variation of all parameter of interest along the y-axis is very restricted. The random
eects of the parameters of interest across districts are very small. This indicates that
much deterministic information about the narrow intervals of the observed candidate and
list-vote shares in these estimations were included. Thus, assumptions of EI that might be
violated are used to a much lesser degree to derive the district-level predictions. Even if
these violations are present, they can only have a minor impact on the estimates because
the deterministic information does the main work in reducing the possible parameter space.
For a closer look at the slope estimates, table 4.1 provides the regression results of the
parameters of interest on the respective candidate vote shares. An inspection of the
scatter plot, moreover, helps to detect possible violations of OLS assumptions. In order to
get correct slope estimates, I deleted the clearly visible outlier district for the estimation
of the FDP straight-ticket shares. The estimation of ﬁGG yields many outlier districts.
Therefore, I estimate it by a Biweight regression to provide robust estimates in the face of
highly leveraged outliers instead of OLS.
In order to diagnose aggregation bias, one must focus on the slope coecients of these
regressions. The overall tendency of the results is quite clear. Three out of four slope
coecients based on the East German sub-sample are not signicant, nor is one slope co-
ecient for the regressions based on the West German sub-sample. Even when signicant,
these slope coecients are very small, indicating only a minor attenuation of the estimates.
The strongest impact of aggregation bias among all eight regressions can be found in the
regression based on strategic split-ticket estimates in the model of the Greens in East
Germany with SPD candidate vote shares as independent variable. The slope coecient in
the last row of the table is :089. This indicates that in a district with an SPD candidate
ten percentage points stronger than average, for instance, the fraction of strategic ticket-
splitters casting a list vote for the Greens is underestimated by :89 percentage point. By
any means, even considering the most extreme case, this can hardly be seen as substantively
inuential. I, therefore, conclude the discussion of the internal consistency problem.
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Table 4.1: Ex-Post Aggregation Bias Check.
Dependent Standard
Variable Coecient Error
West ﬁFF Constant .997 :002
N = 254 (OLS) FDP1 .006 .011
ﬁCF Constant .127 :008
N = 255 (OLS) CDU1 -.084 .020
ﬁGG Constant .953 .001
N = 255 (Biweight) Green1 .044 .010
ﬁSG Constant .113 :008
N = 255 (OLS) SPD1 -.088 .017
East ﬁFF Constant .861 .022
N = 68 (OLS) FDP1 -1.26 .999
ﬁCF Constant .063 .005
N = 68 (Biweight) CDU1 -.023 .015
ﬁGG Constant 1.00 .030
N = 68 (OLS) Green1 -1.04 .992
ﬁSG Constant .081 .009
N = 68 (OLS) SPD1 -.089 .020
In summary, I took several precautionary measures to assess the impact of possible vio-
lations of EI on the estimates and provided several steps to assure that my estimation
strategy is reasonable. With my data set, reducing the general problem into theoretically
derived simplication yields consistent results. Although I detected small aggregation bias
in certain cases, this bias does not appear to be very substantial. Overall, the sensitivity
analysis of EI estimates yields encouraging results. Thus, the next logical steps are to, rst,
construct my independent variables, the number of straight and strategic split-ticket voters
per district, and second, to test my Minor-Party Success Hypothesis on the district-level.
This will be done in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Strategic Voting at the District Level
In the previous chapter, I discussed the internal consistency problem that arises if one
applies King's EI model to an estimation problem that would actually require researchers
to estimate the inner cells of anRC-table simultaneously. Since this problem is currently
intractable, I provided empirical evidence that one can have condence in EI estimates
obtained from collapsing categories to make the estimation problem manageable, given
the data at hand. I will use these EI estimates to characterize variation across electoral
districts in order to study strategic voting at this level. This chapter, then, deals exclusively
with the strategic voting phenomenon across electoral districts. Since I deal with ocial
vote counts aggregated at the district level, I will also address the political implications
of strategic voting. Choosing this level of analysis, I seek to establish whether strategic
ticket-splitting really matters substantively.
Since the list-vote shares determine whether a party is represented in parliament, strate-
gic ticket-splitting should improve the success of minor parties if strategic voting matters
substantively. I expect that the success of minority parties like the FDP and the Greens
depends on the number of strategic ticket-splitters across districts. The followingMinor-
Party Success Hypothesis formally states this expectation.
Hypothesis 1 (Minor-Party Success) The list-vote shares of a minor party in a district
depend on the number of strategic ticket-splitters in that district. The more strategic
ticket-splitters there are, the higher the list-vote shares of the FDP and the Greens.
The challenge with analyzing district-level vote counts is that ticket-splitting cannot be
directly observed because the ocial statistics merely report the total number of candidate
and list votes for any elded candidate or party. Since the ballots cannot be accessed, no
individual-level information is available to see how many voters cast their candidate vote
for X and their list vote for party Y. I compensate for this loss of information by relying
heavily on sophisticated statistical models to extract this information from ocial district-
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level counts of candidate and list votes. I will use EI to construct measures for the number
of straight-ticket voters and strategic ticket-splitters in a district. As eluded to in chapter
3 I will run two separate EI estimations - one for the FDP and one for the Greens - to
construct a district-level measure for the number of straight-ticket voters and strategic
ticket-splitters in the rst stage of my analysis. The Minor-Party Success Hypothesis will
be tested in the second stage of the analysis, employing these district-level measures as
independent variables that are constructed in the rst stage of the analysis.
No one has used EI for the analysis of strategic voting before. In order to make sure that
the results based on these measures are substantively meaningful, I take some precaution-
ary steps. First, I will assess the construct validity of all independent variables constructed
in the rst stage of my analysis. Second, I will use an multiple imputation strategy to ad-
dress the critique that EI does not yield robust results (Cho and Gaines, 2004; Freedman
et al., 1998) by appropriately accounting for the uncertainty inherent in these EI estimates
that constitute my independent variables in the second-stage analysis. Third, I will ver-
ify my results with estimates derived from independent data sources, and show that my
second-stage model predictions are entirely consistent with these results. This strategy
should eectively attenuate all remaining doubts inherent in conclusions based on variables
constructed by EI.
In the previous chapter, I provided evidence that the strategy employed in the rst-stage of
my analysis - namely, of running EI separately to obtain estimates for straight and strategic
ticket-splitting - is reasonable. I will now construct the district-level measures of interest.
Recall that from King's EI, I obtain estimates of the parameters of interest (see table
3.2). These are the estimated fractions of straight-ticket and split-ticket voters casting a
vote for a particular candidate. Both independent variables should be on the same scale as
the dependent variable, in order to facilitate interpretation of the coecients. I therefore
multiply the estimates of these fractions - the ﬁ 's - by the respective share of candidate
votes in that district to transform them into fractions of list-vote shares. Since these
values are very small, I then multiply this product by 100 to get percentages as units for
the independent variables. This also eases interpretation. For the FDP model, my measure
for the shares of straight tickets in district \i" is ﬁFFi FDP1i 100 and for strategic ticket-
splitting shares it is consequently ﬁCFi CDU1i  100. The same logic applies to the model
of the Greens. My measure for the shares of straight-ticket voting isﬁGGi  Green1i  100
and ﬁSGi  SPD1i  100 for strategic ticket-splitting, respectively.
After establishing that measures based on rst-stage EI estimations are valid in a technical
sense, and after nally constructing the independent variables, one important question has
to be answered: Are these variables measuring what they are supposed to measure? One
way to assess the construct validity of these measures is to present the district values
of these variables in a map and see whether they t expectations that are derived from
qualitative knowledge of the problem. It would be interesting to see whether EI recovers
well-known strongholds of the parties. A valid measure should certainly reect this verity.
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Figure 5.1: EI District-Level Predictions: Green Straight Ticket Shares for West Germany.
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Figure 5.1 maps the measure of Green straight-ticket shares for West Germany based on
the EI point estimate ﬁGGi . The darker the district is shaded, the higher the share of
straight tickets, i.e. the stronger the loyal base is estimated in that district.
The map of all German electoral districts shows1 some very dark spots that have a less-
than-coincidental characteristic in common: Every dark spot represents a district with a
university town. This is of course what one would expect, for the Greens enjoy an especially
strong loyal base in university towns. Furthermore, the map shows that the Greens have a
very weak loyal base in well-known conservative districts in Bavaria, which also conforms to
a \folk-political" intuition of the facts, the popular understanding of politics in Germany.
Similar inspections can be undertaken for the other variables as well. It is quite comforting
that EI is able to recover typical strongholds, implying that the constructed measures do,
in fact, measure what they are supposed to measure.
How strong are the loyal bases of the FDP and the Greens? Do they vary much? And
perhaps more importantly, how many strategic ticket-splitters are there? Such descriptive
questions can be answered by looking at the actual values of the independent variables
across districts. Since the EI estimation in the rst stage of the analysis is done separately
for both parts of the country, I also present the summary statistics separately. As noted
above, I employ a multiple imputation strategy to deal with the uncertainty of these esti-
mates stemming from the rst-stage analysis. Moreover, this strategy directly addresses
the recent critique that EI does not yield robust results (Cho and Gaines, 2004; Freedman
et al., 1998) across replications. If these rst stage EI point estimates are not \similar
enough", the variance across several simulations grows and appropriately enlarges the stan-
dard errors around the multiple imputation point estimates. Thus, this strategy accounts
for the lack of robustness of the rst stage EI estimation.
Table 5.1 provides an overview of rst-stage EI estimates of straight-ticket and split-ticket
voters in East and West Germany. The overall estimates are the weighted average of all
district-level estimates. Since the districts vary in the number of validly cast list votes, the
individual district-level estimates from the rst stage of the analysis must be weighted by
1 over the number of valid list-vote shares. The weighted average thereby derived provides
correct aggregate-level estimate for the number of straight-ticket and strategic split-ticket
voters in both parts of the country.
Both parties do better in West Germany than in East Germany. These estimates show
that the loyal base for both parties is smaller in the East than in the West. In fact, most
prominently only the Greens in the West get enough straight tickets to overcome the
institutional threshold of 5%. Nevertheless, since this threshold has to be reached on the
national level, the low shares in the East keep not only the FDP but also the Greens under
1) I would like to thank Volkmar Kroesch (Federal Oce for Building and Regional Planning) for sharing an
ArcView shape-le (Bundesamt fur Bauwesen und Raumordnung, 1998) that denes the geographical
boundaries of the electoral districts.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of rst-stage EI Estimates
 Overall Estimates, weighted Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err.
WEST Straight Tickets 3.00 1.18 5.10 2.35
Strategic Split Tickets 4.50 1.85 2.90 2.71
   
EAST Straight Tickets 2.19 0.74 3.26 1.11
Strategic Split Tickets 1.74 0.46 2.57 0.77
   
Note. Values are measured in percent.
F.D.P.  Green
5%.2 These estimates clearly show that the loyal base of both parties, i.e. the straight-
ticket voters for the FDP and the Greens - is not strong enough to ensure that these minor
parties overcome the national 5% threshold. The substantive conclusion I draw from this
table, therefore, is that both parties need the support of strategic voters in order to be
represented in parliament and to be able form a coalition with one of the major parties.
Although the nature of the party system is not the same in East and West Germany, the
logic of strategic voting should hold in both parts of the country - presumably at a dierent
level, however. I will combine the districts for East and West Germany and estimate one
model with FDP list-vote shares as a dependent variable and one model predicting list-vote
shares of the Greens. Since both parties fare better in the West than in the East, I include
a dummy to allow for the hypothesized logic of straight-ticket and strategic split ticket
voting to operate at dierent levels.
According to my theory, certain split-ticket patterns - a candidate vote for the CDU and a
list vote for FDP, or a candidate vote for the SPD and a list vote for the Greens - reect
either the wasted vote strategy or the coalition insurance strategy. The more strategic
voters in a district, the higher the list-vote shares for the FDP and the Greens. In order to
disentangle this eect from mere sincere voting, I wish to control for the size of the parties'
loyal base in the districts because the numbers of sincere straight ticket voters for these
parties are also obviously related to their list-vote shares. The stronger theloyal base, i.e.,
the higher the share of FDP or Green straight-ticket voters in a district, the higher the
parties' list-vote share should be.
Thus far, the model includes a dummy variable and two independent variables (one mea-
suring the number of straight-ticket voters and the number of strategic split-ticket voters
2) Since approximately 80% of the valid list votes are cast in the West, the EI estimate for the loyal base
of the Greens on the national level would be 4.74% (= 5:10 :8 + 3:26 :2).
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in a district, respectively). Moreover, one can be suciently assured that, although it took
an extra step to construct two of them, these variables measure what they are supposed to
measure. The question remains, however, of what the appropriate functional form is that
describes the underlying data-generating process. Assuming that thewasted-vote strategy
and the coalition insurance strategy are reasonably good abstractions of what is going on
in the head of a strategic voter, then, the relationship between straight-ticket voters and
strategic ticket-splitters is not simply additive but multiplicative.
This notion requires some clarication. According to my theory, there are four types of
voters: straight-ticket voters, ordinary strategic voters, coalition voters and non-strategic
ticket-splitters. Not every one of these groups can be adequately described with district-
level data. Instead, this will be done with individual-level data in the next chapter. Voters
can only be distinguished by the way they cast their ballots. Thus, even with district-level
data, one can distinguish between three groups: straight-ticket voters, strategic ticket-
splitters that combine ordinary strategic voters and coalition voters, and voters who neither
cast a straight ticket nor split their ticket strategically. These voters fall in the residual
category of non-strategic ticket-splitters. Furthermore, the particular electoral institutions
of mixed electoral systems provide various incentives to vote strategically. What does
this imply for the relationship of the number of straight-ticket voters and strategic ticket-
splitters?
First, take a hypothetical FDP supporter, for instance. She most likely casts a straight
ticket to support her most preferred party, the FDP. Since the local FDP representative
is not likely to win the district race given plurality rule, she might as well anticipate this
fact and cast her candidate vote strategically for the CDU candidate. The wasted-vote
strategy is especially attractive in close races between the CDU and the SPD candidates.
Thus, the more voters who cast an ordinary strategic vote, the fewer people there will be
to cast a straight ticket. This logic obviously holds for the Greens and the SPD as well.
Second, take another hypothetical voter, this time a CDU supporter. As in the case of the
FDP, this voter also most likely casts a straight ticket to support her most preferred party,
the CDU. Nevertheless, she might as well cast a coalition vote to ensure that that the
smaller coalition partner overcomes the national threshold. Depending on her particular
expectation about the success of the smaller coalition partner, the coalition insurance
strategy provides incentives in varying degrees. Thus, the more voters who cast a coalition
vote, the fewer people who cast a straight ticket. Like the case of the FDP, this logic
holds for the Greens and the SPD as well.
Taking these two observations together, I conclude that the more voters behave strategi-
cally, in either way, the less there are straight ticket voters for the FDP and the Greens
in the district.3 Therefore, the eect of strategic ticket-splitting for the list-vote share of
3) The relationship between non-strategic ticket-splitters and either straight ticket voters or strategic
ticket-splitters is not clear, because there is no theory of how they might relate to one another.
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the FDP and the Greens, respectively, should vary according to the amount of straight
tickets in the same district. The appropriate way to model a multiplicative relationship
between the size of the loyal base and the number of strategic ticket-splitters is to include
an interaction term in the model. Hence, I estimate the following model for the FDP and
the Greens, respectively.
Y = 0 + 1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3 + 4(X2 X3) + i ; i  N(0; ﬀi2)
My dependent variable is the list vote share of the FDP and the Green party4. Although
at a dierent level, the logic of strategic voting should hold in both parts of the country.
Since both parties fare better in the West than in the East, I include a \West"-dummy
X1, with 1 indicating that the district is in West Germany and a 0 indicating that it lies
in the former GDR. Since both parties fare better in the West than in the East, I expect
1 to be positive in the FDP and the Green Model. I further hypothesize that the amount
of both straight-ticket (X2) and strategic split-ticket voting (X3) has a positive impact on
the dependent variable. I expect the regression coecients2 and 3 to be signicantly
greater than zero. Since I hypothesized that the number of strategic ticket-splitters in a
district is conditional on the size of the loyal base - and vice versa - I expect 4 to be
negative.
After running several diagnostic procedures, I rejected the OLS assumption that the error
variance is constant across the districts. This is not out-of-the-ordinary with aggregate
data. There are substantive reasons to expect that the mean component of the model is a
better predictor in some circumstances than in others. These uncertainties have a name.
I will model them directly by specifying the following link function (Franklin, 1991; Harvey,
1976; King, 1989) for the variance component of the model that predicts the spread around
the regression line.
ln(ﬀ2i ) = 0 + 1Z1 + 2Z2 + 3Z3 + 4Z4
The rst factor that introduces introduce systematic uncertainty in the model is the level
of competitiveness in the district. A close district race should discipline voters' intention to
split their ticket in a non-strategic manner. Voters form expectations about the compet-
itiveness of a district race, and are more likely to behave in a predictable fashion - voting
either for the candidate of their most preferred party, or cast a strategic candidate vote to
help the competitive candidate of the larger coalition party to win the district race - if the
race is close. Similar to many studies of strategic voting (Black, 1978, 1980; Cain, 1978),
I measure the expected competitiveness of the district race by the margin of the district
race. The advantage of this measure, as opposed to employing the margin of the race in
previous elections, is that the candidates of the district race might change. Furthermore,
4) An argument can be made that the dependent variable should be logistically transformed, because it
is bounded by 0 and 100 (Y = ln( ~Y
100 ~Y ), with ~Y being the list-vote shares of that party). Although
I obtain substantively the same results, I choose to present the results with the untransformed version
of the dependent variable to ease interpretation.
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the margin of the current election is closer in time to the point when voters actually form
their expectation about the race, and therefore captures this factor better than alternative
measures. Z1 is the absolute value of the dierence in candidate vote shares between the
two top contenders in a district race. Since open races should introduce more uncertainty
in the strategic logic that is tested by the mean component of the model, I expect1 to
be positive. Districts with open races should spread wider around the regression line than
very competitive races.
The remaining three factors add an institutionalist avor to the model of the variance
component. The second factor Z2 explaining the non-constant variance across districts
has to do with the varying experience people have with the strategic logic in mixed electoral
systems. I have already hypothesized that the strategic logic operates at dierent levels,
depending on the nature of party competition in both parts of the country. Moreover,
this logic should describe the circumstances in the West better than in the East, because
the overwhelming majority of voters in the East have the experience of only two Federal
Elections (1990 and 1994) since Reunication. Moreover, the \PDS factor" is likely to
distort the strategic logic between the SPD and the Greens in East Germany.5 For both
reasons, I expect the model predictions for list-vote shares of the FDP and the Greens in
the East to be less precise than in the West. Consequently,2 should be negative.
Furthermore, the greater the variety of parties, the less precise my model predictions will be.
In districts where more parties are elded than the four parties I am hypothesizing about, I
expect wider distribution of list-vote shares and split-ticket patterns than accounted for by
my theory and captured by the mean component of the model. Z3 represents the natural
logarithm of the number of parties that are running in a particular district. I choose the
logarithm, because I expect diminishing returns. Whether 15 or 16 parties are running
should increase the error variance to a smaller degree than whether 5 or 6 parties are
elded.6 Thus, I expect 3 to be positive.
Finally, the fourth factor inuencing the error variance is the number of valid list votes.
Although the electoral law requires that the number of eligible voters does not vary \too
much" across districts, the number of valid votes, which corresponds to 100%, might vary
considerably across districts. All else equal, I expect more precise model predictions in a
district with a higher number of valid list votes, and therefore a negative4. I divided the
valid list votes in every district by 10,000 to constructZ4 in order to ease interpretation
of its coecient.
5) The PDS, as a party on the left of the political spectrum, attracts voters who otherwise cast their
votes for the SPD or the Greens or who split their ticket between the two.
6) Even if I use the absolute number of parties, the substantive result stay the same.
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Table 5.2: ML Heteroscedastic Regression across 6 simulated data sets with the Parties'
List-Vote Share as Dependent Variable
N = 323
Ind. Variables Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Mean Component 
West 0.806 0.053 0.845 0.051 0.741 0.054 0.815 0.050 0.857 0.050 0.877 0.050
Straight Tickets 0.480 0.043 0.465 0.042 0.474 0.043 0.435 0.041 0.433 0.041 0.427 0.040
Strategic Split Tickets 1.135 0.028 1.118 0.026 1.103 0.027 1.103 0.024 1.100 0.024 1.060 0.022
Straight x  Strategic Split -0.060 0.007 -0.058 0.007 -0.057 0.007 -0.053 0.007 -0.052 0.007 -0.051 0.006
Constant 0.522 0.106 0.570 0.101 0.706 0.104 0.674 0.100 0.643 0.101 0.762 0.096
Variance Component
Competitiveness 0.021 0.009 0.021 0.009 0.027 0.009 0.035 0.009 0.034 0.009 0.042 0.009
West 0.026 0.313 0.242 0.305 0.320 0.318 0.165 0.306 0.150 0.303 0.260 0.318
ln (# Parties) 0.907 0.500 0.200 0.496 0.335 0.494 0.577 0.490 0.616 0.481 -0.318 0.500
Valid # List Votes -0.063 0.037 -0.039 0.037 -0.058 0.036 -0.094 0.035 -0.105 0.035 -0.055 0.036
Constant -4.339 1.397 -2.875 1.367 -3.056 1.369 -3.306 1.338 -3.229 1.313 -1.459 1.385
N = 323
Ind. Variables Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Systematic 
West 2.453 0.105 2.635 0.105 2.851 0.101 2.826 0.104 2.610 0.103 2.799 0.101
Straight Tickets 0.439 0.038 0.449 0.038 0.425 0.039 0.425 0.039 0.431 0.038 0.434 0.038
Strategic Split Tickets 1.017 0.031 1.004 0.031 1.006 0.032 1.020 0.033 1.000 0.031 1.008 0.032
Straight x  Strategic Split -0.019 0.003 -0.019 0.003 -0.018 0.003 -0.018 0.003 -0.018 0.003 -0.019 0.003
Constant 0.119 0.124 -0.080 0.123 -0.221 0.118 -0.157 0.121 -0.064 0.122 -0.170 0.117
Variance
Competitiveness 0.030 0.010 0.030 0.010 0.023 0.010 0.026 0.011 0.029 0.010 0.029 0.011
West -1.332 0.252 -1.293 0.252 -0.979 0.252 -1.020 0.256 -1.394 0.249 -1.130 0.252
ln (# Parties) 3.137 0.400 3.263 0.408 3.420 0.411 3.239 0.412 3.400 0.416 3.526 0.419
Valid # List Votes -0.085 0.036 -0.086 0.036 -0.093 0.037 -0.086 0.036 -0.083 0.037 -0.102 0.037
Constant -8.211 1.332 -8.592 1.348 -9.147 1.364 -8.687 1.377 -8.981 1.367 -9.287 1.373
Dependent Variable: Green List Vote Shares
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6
Dependent Variable: F.D.P. List Vote Shares
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6
I will use an multiple imputation strategy to address the critique that EI does not yield robust
results (Cho and Gaines, 2004; Freedman et al., 1998) and to appropriately account for the
uncertainty of the rst-stage estimates, since these are not true observations. Since I rst
run six EI simulations - i.e., six runs of the model based on the same data le - I generate
six dierent data sets (one for each EI simulation) and estimate both the mean and the
variance component of the regression model simultaneously by Maximum Likelihood (ML).
The ML results of the second-stage analysis based on six rst-stage EI-simulations with
EzI are presented in table 5.2.
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Table 5.2 provides an overview of the estimated coecients, their robustness, as well
as their uncertainty measures across all simulations. The very same model is estimated
for dierent data sets based on dierent simulations. Clearly, the coecients and their
standard errors stay almost the same from one simulation to the next. The only exceptions
to this pattern are some coecients of the variance component in the FDP model. It is
important to note that variation across these six models is only due to variations of the
rst-stage EI point estimates, since all other variables of the mean or variance component
are the same across data sets. This implies that the criticism of (Cho and Gaines, 2004;
Freedman et al., 1998) that EI estimations are not robust might generally be very important
and their robustness should be analyzed routinely for diagnostic purposes. Nonetheless, the
instability of EI estimates seems instead to depend on the data set at hand and not on the
particular estimation method. At least the estimation results with my data suggest that
\unrobust" estimates are not intrinsic to EI.
Nevertheless, second-stage inferences based on independent variables that are essentially
predicted values of a rst-stage analysis (the most prominent examples include applications
of NOMINATE scores as predictor variables in studies about the U.S. Congress, see Poole
and Rosenthal (1997)) systematically overestimate the condence associated with these
coecients. In order to capture the uncertainty that is involved if we treat predicted values
as observations, I use a multiple imputation strategy. If the estimates vary too much from
one simulation to another, then the standard errors will explode. The resulting multiple
imputation estimates with appropriate standard errors that account for the uncertainty
involved in using rst-stage EI point estimates in a second-stage analysis are presented in
table 5.3.
As should be the case, the standard errors of the multiple imputation estimates are slightly
bigger as compared to those based on a single simulation in table 5.2, since the simulated
\across-variance" is added to the average of the estimated \within-variance" (King et al.,
2001). Nevertheless, table 5.3 shows that every coecient in the mean component is in
the expected direction and is signicant. As hypothesized, the number of strategic ticket-
splitters is systematically related to the success of minor parties like the FDP and the
Greens, accounting for this logic to play at dierent levels in East and West Germany.
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The second-stage results show that the impact of strategic voters on the list-vote shares
is similar for the Greens and for the FDP. The coecients for the impact of the size of
the loyal base on the list-vote shares are not systematically dierent from each another.
Nevertheless, these eects are conditional on one another, since the interaction term is
signicantly dierent from zero. Thus it shows that the number of strategic ticket-splitters
in a district depends on the size of the loyal base - and vice versa.
Table 5.3: Resulting Multiple Imputation Estimates of the second-stage Analysis
Ind. Variables Coeff. Std.Err. p Coeff. Std.Err. p
Mean Component 
West 0.824 0.073 0.000 2.696 0.198 0.000
Straight Tickets 0.452 0.049 0.000 0.434 0.039 0.000
Strategic Split Tickets 1.103 0.037 0.000 1.009 0.033 0.000
Straight x  Strategic Split Ticket -0.055 0.008 0.000 -0.018 0.003 0.000
Constant 0.646 0.139 0.000 -0.096 0.177 0.597
Variance Component
Competitiveness 0.030 0.013 0.030 0.028 0.011 0.011
West 0.194 0.330 0.558 -1.191 0.314 0.000
ln (# Parties) 0.386 0.672 0.571 3.331 0.439 0.000
Valid # List Votes -0.069 0.045 0.133 -0.089 0.037 0.018
Constant -3.044 1.692 0.080 -8.818 1.427 0.000
N 323 323
Cor (Y,Yhat)2 0.98 0.94
   
Note. p- values are for two-tailed tests.
F.D.P. Greens
The same one-percentage-point increase in the number of strategic ticket-splitters per
district has on average less inuence on the list vote shares of the FDP or the Greens as
the loyal base grows. Since the interaction term is negative, the eect of ticket-splitting
for list-vote shares of these has a greater weight if the loyal base of the party is smaller.
This underscores the importance of strategic voters for both parties.
In addition, every coecient in the variance component of the Green model is signicant
and in the expected direction. The closer the district race, the more precisely the systematic
model component performs. This also holds true in the FDP variance function, where there
is much less heteroscedasticity to begin with. Since the experience argument should also
predict the FDP variance component, but and since only the \West" dummy coecient in
the Green model is signicant, this hypothesis must be rejected. The conclusion would be
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that it is merely the existence of the PDS as another viable party on the left that seems to
distort the strategic logic described by the mean component of the model for the Greens.
The variable capturing the number of parties running in a district has a strong impact
on the variance function for the Green variance component but not for the FDP variance
component. In general, CDU-FDP coalitions are easier to establish as a viable coalition in
a voter's mind, because these parties run as the incumbent governing coalition and have
a long history of working together. This should facilitate that list voters of the FDP split
their ticket in a predictable manner, more so than list voters of the Greens. Thus, for the
predictability of the strategic logic in the Green model, factors like the number of parties
running in a district should have a stronger impact in the rst place. Finally, the eects
of the number of valid list votes is essentially the same for both parties, although because
of the size of the multiple imputation standard error they are only signicant in the Green
model.
In summary, both models show that voters of these parties behave in a predictable fashion.
Despite non-strategic ticket-splitting and sincere straight-ticket voting, the share of strate-
gic ticket-splitters is systematically related to the list-vote shares of these parties. FDP
list voters as well as list voters of the Greens behave in a predictable fashion, as suggested
by the model of the mean component. The results provide strong evidence in support of
the Minor-Party Success Hypothesis.
As a third and last precautionary measure, I take to task whether these results are reason-
able, I will verify the model predictions with an independent data source. Ideally, I would
like to verify my estimation results with individual data on the district-level. Although if
such data were available, there would be no need for any ecological inference. Thus, I
use survey data from the 1998 German National Election Study instead. Since this sur-
vey is designed to be representative of voters in both parts of the country, I will employ
aggregated estimates for strategic ticket-splitters in West and East Germany separately.
This allows for an independent verication of the regression predictions for East and West
Germany.
Verication of the model predictions is relatively straightforward. The ocial results of the
election do exist, and are measured (hopefully) without error. For the model prediction of
the list-vote shares I compute a weighted average of the second-stage predictions. I also
compute the 95% condence intervals for the model predictions7, with weights accounting
for the unequal number of valid list votes in each of the 255 electoral districts in West
Germany and the 68 electoral districts in East Germany. Table 5.4 provides an overview
of the results in West Germany and East Germany, respectively.
7) The standard errors are based on \mean predictions" for the rst simulation.
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Table 5.4: Verication of Model Predictions for West and East Germany.
  
   Lower Upper  Lower Upper
WEST List Vote Shares predicted 6.98 6.91 7.05 7.39 7.26 7.53
official 6.97 7.32
Strategic Split Tickets predicted 4.50 4.27 4.73 2.90 2.57 3.24
 survey 4.39 2.97 5.81 4.23 2.83 5.63
EAST List Vote Shares predicted 3.30 3.22 3.38 3.99 3.83 4.16
official 3.30 4.17
Strategic Split Tickets predicted 1.74 1.63 1.85 2.57 2.38 2.75
 survey 1.63 0.77 2.49 2.28 1.27 3.29
Note. Values are measured in percent.
95% CI95% CI
F.D.P. Greens
Table 5.4 shows that the ocial results of the 1998 election in both parts of Germany are
within the 95% condence intervals of the aggregated model predictions from my second-
stage model. In fact, the predicted list vote shares for the FDP are nearly identical with
the ocial result. The same is true for the predicted list vote shares for the Greens in
West Germany. For East Germany, the model also performs extremely well, both for the
second vote shares of the Greens and the FDP. In fact, the FDP prediction is exactly the
ocial results until the second decimal point.
In order to verify the model predictions for strategic voters directly one must show more
creativity, since ocial records are not available about the distribution of various split-
ticket patterns. Particularly, I use weighted marginal values derived from vote intention
questions about the candidate and the list vote in order to get an unbiased estimate for
the amount of strategic split-ticket voting between the CDU and the FDP and the SPD
and the Greens. Obviously, since these surveys do not represent the dierent populations
at the district level, I can only verify them at a higher aggregated level, namely for East
and West Germany.
Generally, the predictions from the FDP model are more accurate than from the Green
model because the condence intervals of the FDP point estimates are tighter. Again, the
predictions of the amount of ticket-splitting between CDU and FDP for West Germany
are almost perfect, while the ticket-splitting prediction from the Green-model is a bit o
but still within the 95% condence interval derived from survey data. In East Germany the
model performs very well, too. The predictions of the FDP model are also slightly better
than for the Green model, which slightly underestimates the ocial result. Overall, based
on the model predictions for West Germany, I estimate that 7.40% (= 2:90% + 4:50%)
of all voters cast their vote strategically and in East Germany 4.31% (= 2:57% + 1:74%)
adding up to a total of 11.71% of strategic voters in the 1998 election. Overall, the
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accuracy of the model predictions is quite remarkable. The 95% condence interval for
the strategic voters overlaps with the corresponding condence interval around the point
estimate for these strategic voters derived from survey data. This provides further evidence
that my district-level predictions are valid.
This chapter not only provides overwhelming support for theMinor-Party Success Hypoth-
esis that the number of strategic voters in a district are related to the success of minor
parties. Rather, it also translates into very strong results, most importantly about the
dependency of the survival of these parties on strategic voters. The EI estimates suggest
that, without the support of strategic voters, these parties could not make it above the
institutional threshold of 5%. Although there is still a sizable group of non-strategic ticket-
splitters, especially in the Green model, it is not clear how to systematically win over these
voters. Party strategists must court on strategic voters to ensure that the FDP and the
Greens are represented in parliament since the behavior of non-strategic ticket splitters is
unpredictable.
Although the political implications of strategic voting are potentially enormous, even if
the group of strategic voters is relatively small, in order to disentangle strategic voters in
ordinary strategic voters and coalitions voters and to explain this type of behavior I will rely
on survey data. This will be done in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6
Strategic Voting at the Individual Level
The last chapter provided strong evidence for theMinor-Party Success Hypothesis. Strate-
gic voting clearly matters substantively. Across electoral districts, the list-vote shares of
the FDP and the Greens depend not only on their loyal base of straight-ticket voters, but
also on the number of strategic ticket-splitters. In fact, the size of their loyal base is not
strong enough to overcome the national threshold without the support of these strate-
gic ticket-splitters. In order to disentangle the group of strategic ticket-splitters, I use
individual-level data. Particularly, I formulated several hypotheses in chapter 3 pertaining
to the individual level that I propose to test in this chapter. Toward this end, I will rst
focus on my choice of two specic dependent variables. Second, I will discuss the oper-
ationalization of my remaining hypotheses in sequence, in order to set the stage for the
analysis. In this regard it is important to note that all individual-level hypotheses are tested
simultaneously, because conceptually, they should all funnel into a voter's decision-making
calculus. Finally, I will present the analysis and the interpretation of the results.
In a mixed electoral system like Germany's, voters have the opportunity to cast two votes:
a candidate vote for the local party representative on the rst ballot, and a list vote for
a particular party on the second ballot. There are many conceivable possibilities of how
voters could split their tickets. The 1998 German NES study on which this analysis is based
was conducted right after the election, and has two vote-recall items for the candidate and
list vote. Since I am interested in explaining why some voters cast a strategic vote as
opposed to a straight ticket, or whether they split their tickets in a non-strategic fashion,
any dependent variable employed must be polytomous. Some of my hypotheses try to
disentangle both types of strategic behavior - that is, an ordinary strategic vote from a
coalition vote. I will therefore use two dierent dependent variables.
My rst dependent variable has three categories: (a) respondents casting a straight ticket,
(b) those who split their ticket in a non-strategic way, and (c) those who split their ticket
strategically. In chapter 3 I laid out a theory why some ticket-splitters are considered
strategic. Thus, respondents who cast a candidate vote for the CDU representative and
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a list vote for the FDP are considered strategic, as are respondents who cast a candidate
vote for the SPD representative and a list vote for the Greens.
Since several hypotheses are tailored around disentangling both types of strategic voting,
I divide the group of strategic voters into two separate categories. My second dependent
variable has, therefore, four categories: (a) respondents casting a straight ticket, (b)
those who split their ticket in a non-strategic way, (c) respondents who cast an ordinary
strategic vote, and (d) respondents who cast a coalition vote. By comparing respondents'
feeling thermometer scores measured toward various political parties on an 11-point scale,
I distinguish both types of strategic voting according to my theory. If a strategic voter
likes1 the smaller party more, then she is considered an ordinary strategic voter, and if she
likes the major party better, then she is classied as a coalition voter.2
As argued earlier, electoral institutions provide certain incentives to vote strategically that
some voters might take into account before making their decision. Given the electoral rules
in mixed electoral systems, voters employ either the wasted-vote strategy or the coalition
insurance strategy. These incentives describe the context in which an election is held.
Nevertheless, I hypothesize that these institutional incentives to vote strategically should
not be the same for all voters. Rather, I expect them to dier from voter to voter in a
predictable manner. Some voters are more likely to cast a strategic vote because, accord-
ing to my theory, they have a higher proclivity to vote strategically. The proclivity to vote
strategically depends on motivational factors as well as on a voter's capability to under-
stand the manifold implications of the electoral rules. In chapter 3, I developed several
hypotheses to test this theory simultaneously. While the rst hypothesis was tested in the
previous chapter, in the present chapter I will test the remaining hypotheses pertaining to
the individual level. Hypotheses two and three summarize institutional incentives to vote
strategically in mixed-electoral systems.
Hypothesis 2 (Wasted Vote) The closer the district race, the more likely voters are to
follow the wasted-vote strategy and cast an ordinary strategic vote.
The Wasted Vote Hypothesis addresses the strategy at play for the candidate vote. The
competitiveness of the district race is usually measured by the (candidate) vote margin
between the top two contenders (Black, 1978, 1980; Cain, 1978). Since not every dis-
trict is highly competitive, it is reasonable to assume a nonlinear relationship between the
district margin and the likelihood to vote strategically. I measure the competitiveness of
1) The German codebook actually refers to liking and not to feeling close to these parties, in contrast to
the American National Election Study questions.
2) In 19 cases I had to use party identication as a tie-breaker because two parties were tied and ranked
rst. Moreover, I had to delete 139 observations because these respondents reported that they had
not voted.
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the district race, x1, by the square root of the candidate vote margin between the top two
contenders of the district race. This measure accounts for the fact that a hypothetical
additional increase of an already large margin should have a smaller impact on providing
incentives to avoid wasting the candidate vote than in highly competitive races with small
margins.3 My expectation is that the more competitive the district race is - that is, the
smaller the squared root of the district margin - the higher the incentive will be for voters to
avoid wasting their candidate vote on an uncompetitive candidate. Thus, the coecient
of x1 should be negative for the choice between casting an ordinary strategic voting as
opposed to a non-strategic split ticket.
Hypothesis 3 (Coalition Insurance) The more uncertain voters' expectations are whether
or not the smaller coalition partner can overcome the national threshold, the more likely
they are to follow the coalition insurance strategy and cast a coalition vote.
In order to test the Coalition Insurance Hypothesis and to nd evidence for the strategy on
the list vote, one has to assess the impact of voters' expectations about the success of the
two possible small coalition partners, the FDP and the Greens. The 1998 German NES,
unfortunately, includes no question about expectations. There is another pre-election sur-
vey, however, where respondents are asked for their subjective expectations about whether
the FDP and the Greens would get 5% of the list votes. The answer categories run from
\absolutely certain that the party will exceed the 5% threshold" to \absolutely certain that
the party will not". Two middle categories are for respondents who are unsure. 4
3) Moreover, taking the square root of the actual margin also stabilizes the variances and makes the
distribution of these values approximately symmetrical.
4) This survey is not yet publicly available and is conducted by the Mannheim Center for European Social
Research (MZES) at the University of Mannheim together with the Center for Survey Research and
Methodology at Mannheim (ZUMA). I am thankful to Franz Pappi and Paul Thurner for sharing this
data with me.
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My strategy to construct an expectations measure for the 1998 German NES is to \impute"
(i.e., predict) it with the help of the pre-election survey that includes all the requisite
information (King et al., 2001). In constructing an imputation model for expectations
in the pre-election survey data set, I am limited to variables that are also in the 1998
German NES. 5 Overall the \adjustedR2" of the imputation model predicting respondents'
expectations about the FDP and the Greens is smaller than .13.
In order to account for the uncertainty involved in using predicted values from the impu-
tation model, in lieu of actual observations, I generate six dierent sets of imputed values
for the expectations and will report the multiple imputation estimates based on these six
data sets. While the observed values are the same across all data sets, the imputed values
dier and thereby reecting the uncertainty inherent in predicted values. These variables
are continuous because the imputed values can theoretically take on every value, not only
values between 1 and 4. Since the likelihood of a coalition vote should be highest if voters
are unsure whether the small coalition partner can overcome the national threshold, the
likelihood to cast a coalition vote should be curvilinear and highest if voters are at the the-
oretical middle position between both extremes. I therefore fold the imputed expectation
scales at 2.5. Hence small values indicate that respondents are predicted to be unsure
about either outcome. High values indicate that respondents are certain that these parties
either make it above the threshold or not and, thus, are less likely to cast a coalition vote.
I expect that the more unsure the expectation is that the FDP or the Greens garner 5% -
i.e., the lower the score on the folded expectation scalex2 and x3 - the more likely voters
are to cast a coalition vote. I therefore expect the coecients forx2 and x3 in the com-
parison of the probability in the four-choice model of a coalition vote versus the baseline,
to be negative.
I also developed four motivational hypotheses because if voters are motivated in one way
or the other to cast a strategic vote, they have a higher proclivity to think, and therefore
to vote, strategically.
5) I used the following predictor variables: age, level of education, gender, a \West" dummy (coded as
in the previous chapter), a dummy in which 1 signies a respondent list vote for the CDU, another
dummy in which 1 signies a respondent list vote for the FDP (and to predict the expectations for the
Greens I included two dummies in which 1 signies that the respondent cast a list vote for the SPD and
the Greens instead), and a dummy for self-employed respondents. Moreover, I included the following
interaction terms: age  \West" dummy, gender  \West" dummy, and two interactions of the
vote-intention dummies (FDP and CDU for the \FDP" model and SPD and Greens for the \Green"
model) with the \West" dummy. For multiple imputation I use Amelia (Honaker et al., 1999), a
Windows-program. This software can be downloaded fromhttp://gking.harvard.edu/stats.shtml.
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Hypotheses 4 - 7 (Motivation)
4) FDP and Green supporters are more likely to cast an ordinary strategic vote than to
split their ticket non-strategically.
5) CDU and SPD supporters are more likely to cast a coalition vote than to split their
ticket non-strategically.
6) The stronger a voter's partisanship, the more inclined she is to cast a straight ticket.
7) The stronger a ticket-splitter's partisanship, the more likely she is to split her ticket
strategically.
I operationalize the concept of a \party supporter" to be a voter who identies with that
particular party using the standard party identication item. In order to test my fourth
hypothesis about the impact of partisanship, I include a dummy variable for small party
supporters, x4, coding as a 1 those who identify either with the FDP or the Greens and as
a 0 otherwise. To test the fth hypothesis, I constructed another dummy,x5, coding as
a 1 those respondents who reported a party identication for either the CDU or the SPD
and as a 0 otherwise. By implication, the excluded category is comprised of voters who
identify with other parties or do not identify with any party at all. My expectations are
that voters who identify themselves with the FDP or the Greens should be more likely to
cast an ordinary strategic vote and voters who identify themselves with either CDU or FDP
should be more likely to cast a coalition vote than to split their ticket non-strategically.
Hence, I expect a positive coecient for both x4 and x5 in the four-choice model.
Another motivational factor is the strength of partisanship. The impact of extremity
of partisanship is addressed in the sixth and the seventh hypothesis. As in American
NES surveys, respondents of the German NES have to rate their strength of partisan
attachment as weak (= 1), moderate (= 2) or strong (= 3). Respondents without any
partisan identication or people who refuse to report it are recoded as a 0. Finally, I divide
every score by 3, such that the strength of partisanship scale, x6, ranges from 0 to 1 in
order to facilitate comparison of the estimated coecients. My expectation for hypothesis
six is that the stronger a voter's partisanship - that is, the higher the value ofx6 - the more
motivated she will be to cast a sincere straight ticket for her most preferred party. My
expectation for hypothesis seven is that even if a voter splits her ticket, then the stronger
her partisanship will be - that is, the higher she will score on this variable, the more likely
she is to split her ticket strategically. Thus, I expect the coecients ofx6 in the three-
choice model to be positive. The same expectation holds for the four-choice model as well.
Hypothesis 7 predicts that the respective coecient in the rst as well as the third set of
estimates should be positive in the four-choice model.
Finally, the proclivity to vote strategically depends also on a voter's capability to com-
prehend various options that the electoral rules oer her. I expect that the level of a
respondent's political awareness should reect a voter's capability to use these rules most
eectively.
76 Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistik und Wissenschaft, Bd. 2/2004
Strategic Voting at the Individual Level
Hypothesis 8 (Capability) The higher a voter's level of political awareness, the more likely
she will be to cast a strategic vote.
The literature on public opinion is replete with more or less creative attempts to measure
some facet of political awareness, ranging from political participation (such as participating
at rallies, contributing campaign money and engaging in political discussions) to political
interest, political sophistication, educational attainment or media usage (Luskin, 1987;
Zaller, 1992). The theoretical justication to prefer one measure over the other is not
always spelled out. Moreover, some concepts are especially prone to response set biases.
Who, after all, wants to appear uninformed in an interview situation? Thus, on theoretical
as well as on methodological grounds, I prefer factual knowledge questions about politics
in constructing a political awareness scale (x7). Like Zaller (1992), to measure political
awareness I rely on the ability to place the main political parties \correctly" on a left-right
scale.6 In order to get a score of 1 for a \correct" answer, respondents must place parties
on this left-right scale in a meaningful way. Placements are only assessed relative to one
another, for instance, whether one party is located to the right of another party.7 All nine
scores are summed, then divided by the total number of items such that the scale ranges
from 0 to 1. Respondents who either get a location test item wrong, as well as those who
have missing values because they did not place a particular party, score a 0 on this item.
My expectation is that political knowledge should facilitate strategic considerations, and
hence strategic voting. The coecient of x7, determining the choice between a strategic
vote versus the baseline in the three-choice model as well as in the four-choice model for
the probability of casting an ordinary strategic voting versus the baseline and of casting a
coalition vote versus the baseline, should be positive.
In addition to the independent variables stemming from operationalizations of the hypothe-
ses, I also include two control variables in the model. An alternative explanation to strategic
voting for certain types of ticket-splitting is the one of a \personal vote". The understand-
ing in the literature is that personal factors, beyond mere partisanship, inuence voters to
cast a vote for a particular candidate. While there are no appropriate measures to opera-
tionalize this idea directly, it is reasonable to assume that voters who cast a personal vote
as opposed to an ordinary strategic vote have to know at least the name of the candidate
they vote for. This criterion does not clearly disentangle personal voters from ordinary
strategic voters, however. Strategic voters might know the name of the candidate they
6) The German NES has three political knowledge questions that, somewhat curiously, do not scale
together on the same scale.
7) The \correct" answers of the 9 \location tests" are as follows: CDU to the right of the Greens, DVU
to the right of SPD, Republicans to the right of the middle position, PDS to the left of DVU, FDP
not at the extremes (placed neither 1; 2; 3 nor 9; 10; 11), CDU to the right of SPD, SPD to the right
of PDS, FDP to the left of Republicans, and CDU to the left of Republicans. The answers conform
to a standard spatial representation of political parties in Germany. These nine comparative placement
items have an average inter-item correlation of .46 and the additive awareness scale has an alpha
reliability of .88.
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vote for as well, especially since ordinary strategic voters are more likely to be political
aware. This is not a necessary condition, however, since the strategic reasoning \kicks in".
Even if they do not know the name of the candidate they might vote for, ordinary strate-
gic voters can simply rely on the fact that the candidate of the coalition partner is more
competitive than the candidate of their most preferred party. Erring on the conservative
side, and to avoid falsely attenuating the other model coecients, I control for whether
respondents are able to correctly report the name of candidate for whom they voted, and
then construct a name recognition dummy x8 coded as a 1 if they did the name correctly
and a 0 otherwise.
Finally, I include a \West" dummy x9 to account for the fact that the logic of strategic
voting operates on dierent levels in the two regions of the country, since the nature of the
party system is dierent in East and West Germany. Generally, I expect the coecient ofx9
to be positive throughout all sets of coecients in both models, since the logic of casting
a sincere straight-ticket or splitting the ticket strategically should describe the situation in
the West better than in the East. This would also replicate a result of my district-level
analysis in chapter 5 that in the Western part of the country the model predictions are
more precise.
Since the categories of both dependent variables are unordered I will estimate a choice
model in order to test all remaining hypotheses simultaneously. Since all independent
variables are \individual-specic" - that is, they vary across respondents - estimating a
multinomial logit model (MNL) is appropriate. Nevertheless, MNL models yield only con-
sistent estimates if the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption holds in the
data. Since the probability of casting a straight ticket should theoretically be unchanged if
one of the other categories is removed, the IIA assumption should not be violated. Several
Hausman tests support this conjecture.8
The MNL model, as many choice-models, is based on the idea of respondents as expected
utility maximizers. In them, ith respondent's utility to cast either a straight ticket, a
non-strategic split-ticket or a strategic vote is unknown and treated as a random variable.
According to my theory, however, a respondent's utility is a function ofXi , a vector of nine
independent variables xk , k 2 f1; : : : ;9g. A voter is predicted to choose one of the three
choice alternatives (straight ticket, non-strategic split-ticket, strategic split-ticket) for the
rst dependent variable or one of four choice alternatives (straight ticket, non-strategic
split-ticket, ordinary strategic or coalition vote) for the second dependent variable that
has the highest utility to her. Thus, for respondent i 2 f1; : : : ; Ng and choice alternative
j 2 J1 = f0; 1; 2g in case of the rst dependent variable, Y1, or j 2 J2 = f0; 1; 2; 3g for
8) Removing one of two larger categories, Hausman tests failed to reject the null hypothesis that IIA
holds in this data. However, removing one of the smaller categories violated basic assumptions of the
Hausman test. Therefore, I removed both categories and compared the estimated coecients in a
4-choice model with the ones in a 2-choice logit model. The logit coecients were not signicantly
dierent from the ones of the 4-choice model, thereby supporting the null hypothesis that IIA holds in
this data.
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the case of the second dependent variable,Y2, one gets the probability of the ith individual
choosing the jth alternative from a set of J1 alternatives is given by
Pi(Y1 = j) =
eXij
2∑
j=0
eXij
and for j 2 J2 alternatives analogously
Pi(Y2 = j) =
eXij
3∑
j=0
eXij
whereby Xij =
∑K
k=1 j ikxik and xk denotes the kth independent variable. In order to
identify the model, the coecients of one category have to be set to zero as a baseline
against which the coecients of the other response categories are compared. Note that
I set the coecient vector 1 for non-strategic ticket-splitters to zero such that all other
's are estimated relative to this baseline. This is entirely appropriate because my theory
addresses conditions under which voters choose to cast a straight ticket or a strategic vote,
as opposed to splitting their ticket non-strategically.
Since the folded expectation scales x2 and x3 are not observed but rather imputed, I es-
timate the very same model six times, one for each simulated data set. These data sets
vary only in that they have slightly dierent expectation scales, thereby accounting for the
uncertainty inherent in making the assumption of what respondents would have reported
if they had been asked the expectation question. Recall that three of my hypotheses, the
two Motivation Hypotheses about the strength of partisanship as well as theCapability Hy-
pothesis, should be tested in a three-choice model. Table 6.1 presents the MNL coecient
estimates based my rst dependent variable, Y1, with three categories in order to provide
some validity check whether my reasoning about strategic voting can also be empirically
justied and to test the above-mentioned hypotheses.
Overall, across all six data sets, the model correctly classies on average 65.9% of all
respondents. Note that all signicance tests are based on the conservative multiple impu-
tation variance estimates. Moreover, all reported standard errors are White-Huber robust
standard errors and clustered by electoral district to account for the fact that respondents
in the same electoral district react not independently to the incentives provided by the
electoral rules. Focussing only on the test of these three hypotheses, all coecients for
which I had prior expectations are in the predicted direction and statistically signicant at
least at their mean levels, given that all other variables are at their sample mean. In terms
of interpreting these results substantively, the coecients are generally not very helpful
in and of themselves, since MNL is a non-linear and non-additive. Instead, in the more
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interesting four-choice model I will compute later, I will generate predicted probabilities to
assess the impact of changing one independent variable on the likelihood to cast a strategic
vote, holding all other variables constant at a meaningful value.
Table 6.1: Multiple Imputation Estimates of a MNL 3-Choice Model.
Straight Ticket vs. Strategic Voting vs.
Ticket Splitting Ticket Splitting
Independent Variables Coeff. Std.Err. p Coeff. Std.Err. p
Competitiveness (x1) -0.043 0.039 0.276 -0.156 0.080 0.051
Expectation FDP (x2) -0.030 0.167 0.859 0.077 0.364 0.836
Expectation Greens (x3) 0.070 0.206 0.738 0.709 0.263 0.012
PID small parties (x4) -0.224 0.370 0.545 1.725 0.432 0.000
PID major parties (x5) 0.892 0.194 0.000 0.216 0.372 0.562
Strength of PID (x6) 1.516 0.213 0.000 1.133 0.429 0.008
Political Awareness (x7) 0.085 0.167 0.611 1.262 0.428 0.003
Name Recall (x8) 0.925 0.194 0.000 1.016 0.300 0.001
West (x9) 0.363 0.114 0.002 0.918 0.227 0.000
Constant -0.073 0.247 0.766 -3.720 0.538 0.000
N 1872  
Correctly Classified (average) 65.9%
Note. p -values are for two-tailed tests. Coefficients are averaged across six
estimations. Standard errors of multiple imputation estimates account for the 
variance across all six estimations.
Nevertheless it is important to point out that strong partisans are in fact either voting a
straight ticket or, if they split ticket, are splitting their ticket strategically. This nding
supports two of my motivational hypotheses, particularly hypotheses six and seven about
the strength of partisanship, and stands in especially stark contrast to the reasoning and
ndings in the ticket-splitting literature, which still believes in the notion that \all ticket-
splitters are created equal". This is clearly not the case! Instead these ndings lend
support to the idea that strategically motivated ticket-splitters behave dierently from
non-strategic ticket-splitters. Thus, these results provide evidence to rene a longstanding
claim in the ticket-splitting literature that shared considerations are responsible for why
people split their ticket. My theory of strategic voting, if read within the context of this
literature, adds the notion that not every ticket-splitter is motivated equally. Even strong
partisans might end up splitting their ticket in mixed electoral systems. This is a new
argument and is supported by the data that explains in part why some people split their
ticket in the voting booth.
The substantively more interesting model is based on my second dependent variable,Y2,
which disentangles the group of strategic voters into a category of ordinary strategic voters
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and in another category of coalition voters. Before I present and interpret the results of
this model, I would like to draw the reader's attention to the distribution of the depen-
dent variable. An inspection of the distribution of several independent and the dependent
variables reveals that having a partisan attachment for either of the major parties, CDU or
SPD, or for their smaller coalition partners, FDP or the Greens, does not vary acrossall
categories of the dependent variables. It fact, the respective cell size is zero (or essentially
zero) in exactly the categories of the dependent variables where these predictors should
not operate at all.
In order to identify this model I have to constrain these two coecients to zero. This
strategy is followed for the model estimation based on each of the six data sets. The
resulting multiple imputation estimates with non-strategic ticket-splitting as baseline are
shown in table 6.2.
Again, all three sets of estimates are accompanied with robust White-Huber standard
errors that are also clustered for respondents from the same electoral district and, of
course, account for uncertainty of the imputed variables. The four-choice model is more
appropriate to disentangle factors that determine which strategy voters might follow. It
is an appropriate model to test both the Wasted Vote Hypothesis as well as the Coalition
Insurance Hypothesis. Overall, the model t averaged across six estimations classies
two-thirds of all respondents correctly.
Table 6.2: Multiple Imputation Estimates of a MNL 4-Choice Model.
Straight Ticket vs. Ordinary Strategic vs. Coalition Vote vs.
Ticket Splitting Ticket Splitting Ticket Splitting
Independent Variables Coeff. Std.Err. p Coeff. Std.Err. p Coeff. Std.Err. p
Competitiveness (x1) -0.043 0.039 0.280 -0.224 0.107 0.037 -0.081 0.110 0.458
Expectation FDP (x2) -0.030 0.166 0.859 0.044 0.572 0.939 0.113 0.336 0.736
Expectation Greens (x3) 0.070 0.207 0.735 0.745 0.298 0.013 0.690 0.398 0.083
PID small parties (x4) -0.039 0.368 0.916 2.749 0.443 0.000 0 fixed
PID major parties (x5) 1.040 0.192 0.000 0 fixed 1.348 0.462 0.004
Strength of PID (x6) 1.429 0.204 0.000 0.526 0.465 0.258 0.891 0.621 0.151
Political Awareness (x7) 0.084 0.168 0.616 2.045 0.657 0.002 0.593 0.519 0.253
Name Recall (x8) 0.922 0.194 0.000 1.332 0.351 0.000 0.616 0.405 0.129
West (x9) 0.317 1.302 0.808 1.012 0.295 0.001 0.727 0.306 0.018
Constant -0.070 0.248 0.778 -4.866 0.826 0.000 -4.125 0.706 0.000
N 1872   
Correctly Classified (average) 65.8%
Note. p -values are for two-tailed tests. Coefficients are averaged across six estimations. 
Standard errors of multiple imputation estimates account for the variance across all six estimations.
At least if all independent variables are held at their sample mean, the square root of the
district margin as a measure of district competitiveness is a credible incentive for voters
to cast an ordinary strategic vote as opposed to split the ticket non-strategically. As
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predicted by the Wasted Vote Hypothesis the coecient for competitiveness coecient is
statistically signicant in the second set of coecients in support of this hypothesis. As
should be the case, this variable only has a signicant impact for the comparison between
ordinary strategic voters and non-strategic ticket-splitters, indicating that in competitive
districts, voters behave more predictably - that is, they do not split their ticket in a non-
strategic fashion. To ease the interpretation of this coecient, consider the following
gure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Simulated Impact of District Competitiveness on the Probability to Cast an
Ordinary Strategic Vote. The horizontal axis indicates the competitiveness of the dis-
trict race. The vertical lines represent the 95% condence intervals around the simulated
predicted probabilities.
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For this gure I simulated the predicted probabilities, along with their 95% condence
intervals, of casting an ordinary strategic vote conditional on the competitiveness of the
district race, that is the candidate vote margin of the top two contenders in each district, in
the western part of the country, whereby all other variables are set to their mean. Clearly
the impact of the wasted vote strategy is non-linear and is strongest in close election.
This supports the Wasted Vote Hypothesis. Apparently the most precise predictions are
obtained if the top two contenders in the district are between 10 and 15 percentage points
from one another. The point predictions increase strongly if a district margin is below ve
percent. Unfortunately, the length of the condence intervals increase, too, because the
respondents in this data set lived in districts that were often not closely contested.
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Going back to the MNL estimation results in table 6.2, theCoalition Insurance Hypothesis
for viable coalition structures in Germany predicts that the expectation coecients should
be negative in the third set of estimates. Although election campaigns provide anecdotal
evidence for it, at least with this data set the hypothesis has to be rejected. Two reasons
might be responsible for that. First, since the t of the imputation model is not great, it is
likely that multiple imputation procedure does only produce very noisy predictions. It might
be asking too much of the data to get strong results if there is not a lot information in the
data to begin with. Second, the mechanism behind thecoalition insurance strategy might
be only partly described by voter's expectation that the small coalition partner is in danger
of falling below the national threshold. I will investigate this question in future research.
Moreover, I formulated several Motivation Hypotheses (hypothesis four to seven). If small
party supporters split their ticket, they should be more likely to cast an ordinary strategic
vote. The respective coecient in the second set of estimates is indeed signicant and
positive supporting hypothesis four about the impact of party identication for small party
supporters. The fact that I had to constrain the respective coecient to zero in the third
set of estimates, since there is no small party supporter in the data set casting a coalition
vote, is also another indication that small party supporters behave in a predictable manner
consistent with my theory. Major party supporters, according to my fth hypothesis, should
be motivated to cast a coalition vote instead of splitting their ticket non-strategically. This
is exactly what the signicantly positive estimate in the third set of estimates indicates
supporting the fth hypothesis about the motivation that major party supporters have to
cast a strategic vote. As before, and consistent with my reasoning, I had to constraint
the respective coecient for voters who identify with one of the two major parties to zero
because there is no respondent in the data set who identies with a major party casting an
ordinary strategic vote.
Not only whether voters identify with a party but also how strong this attachment is should
motivate voters to cast their votes in predictable ways. The sixth hypothesis states that
strong partisans should be more motivated to cast a straight-ticket than to split their ticket
non-strategically. In support of this hypothesis the respective coecient in the rst set of
estimates is positive and highly signicant. Hypothesis seven states that if strong partisans
split their tickets then they should be more motivated to split it strategically. Recall that
the evidence stemming from the 3-choice model already supports this hypothesis. The
fact that in the four-choice model the respective coecient in the second and the third
set of estimates is not signicant indicates that disentangling the group of strategic ticket-
splitters into ordinary strategic voters and coalition voters reduces number of observations
in these cells and therefore decreases the power of the test. Presumably, with more obser-
vations in these cells these coecients should be also signicant and positive, replicating
the ndings of the three-choice model in table 6.1.
Finally, my eighth hypothesis, the Capability Hypothesis, which is also already supported
by the estimation results of the three-choice model in table 6.1, does not speak directly to
both types of strategic voting separately. Although I had no predictions for the respective
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coecient in the second and the third set of estimates it is interesting to note that political
awareness does only play a role in determining an ordinary strategic vote but not a coalition
vote. Thus, this hypothesis could be rened for further studies. Apparently it is more
dicult to grasp the incentive behind an ordinary strategic vote than a coalition vote. This
is not inconsistent with my theory because people have generally not a hard time to gure
out viable coalition formations but it is harder to asses the competitiveness of the district
race because it is often below the radar screen of many voters. Beyond information about
possible coalitions during electoral campaigns, people rely on theelectoral history heuristic.
In the case of Germany, both viable coalitions have developed a history of working together
across state legislatures and across time in the Bundestag.9
In summary, the last Motivation Hypothesis, hypothesis seven, and the Capability Hypoth-
esis are supported by the three-choice model and the Wasted Vote Hypothesis as well as
the remaining Motivation Hypotheses, that is, hypotheses four to six, are supported by the
four-choice model. This model also suggests a renement of the Capability Hypothesis
for further analysis. Apparently, even political unaware voters are able to grasp the logic
of the coalition insurance strategy. Thus, with the exception of the Coalition Insurance
Hypothesis, all hypotheses are supported by the model results, given that all estimates are
conditional on the sample mean values of the remaining predictor variables.
Coecient estimates, however, are not all that helpful in assessing the substantive impact
of a particular independent variable on one of the four possible outcomes: straight-ticket,
ticket-splitting (non-strategically), ordinary strategic vote or coalition vote. One way to
provide an overview about the substantive impact of the estimated coecients is to inspect
marginal eects of a change in independent variables on the dependent variable. Table 6.3
presents the marginal eects of each independent variable on the probability to vote a
straight-ticket, split the ticket non-strategically or cast either an ordinary strategic vote or
a coalition vote.10
9) Compelling arguments can be made that the level of motivation that determines a voter's proclivity
to vote strategically is conditional on her capability to comprehend the implications of these options.
Moreover, I expect the incentives to vote strategically to be more credible among high sophisticates
(respondents who score high on the political awareness scale) than among low sophisticates. Unfor-
tunately, the respective cell sizes are very small. This indicates that there cannot be much statistical
power to begin with in reaching statistical signicance for the coecient of the hypothesized inter-
actions, as the cell sizes for the strategic voting categories are very small. In fact, including these
interactions in the model neither does not improve the model t signicantly nor do the associated
coecients come out signicant. I will test these ideas more rigorously in future work by pooling
cross-sectional data over several elections.
10) The estimated marginal eects are based on the rst out of six data sets since the coecients are
pretty stable across all six data sets.
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Table 6.3: Marginal Eects on the Probability of dierent Outcomes.
Straight Ticket Ticket Splitting Ordinary Strategic Coalition Vote
Independent Variables dy/dx Std. Err. p dy/dx Std. Err. p dy/dx Std. Err. p dy/dx Std. Err. p
Competitiveness (x1) -0.005 0.008 0.517 0.009 0.007 0.209 -0.003 0.002 0.100 -0.001 0.003 0.736
Expectation FDP (x2) -0.031 0.022 0.159 0.032 0.021 0.126 -0.006 0.006 0.296 0.005 0.007 0.512
Expectation Greens (x3) -0.009 0.022 0.674 -0.022 0.021 0.301 0.010 0.005 0.029 0.020 0.006 0.000
PID small parties (x4) -0.153 0.072 0.034 -0.048 0.056 0.391 0.206 0.059 0.001 -0.005 0.006 0.398
PID major parties (x5) 0.167 0.030 0.000 -0.168 0.025 0.000 -0.014 0.003 0.000 0.015 0.013 0.246
Strength of PID (x6) 0.273 0.040 0.000 -0.260 0.037 0.000 -0.010 0.009 0.230 -0.002 0.015 0.863
Political Awareness (x7) -0.023 0.034 0.486 -0.027 0.031 0.379 0.039 0.012 0.001 0.012 0.012 0.324
Name Recall (x8) 0.140 0.027 0.000 -0.149 0.026 0.000 0.013 0.008 0.107 -0.004 0.008 0.631
West (x9) 0.046 0.022 0.039 -0.072 0.020 0.000 0.016 0.006 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.132
Note. p -values are for two-tailed tests. Marginal effects are computed if all other independent variables are set to
their sample mean. 
The interpretation of these marginal eects is relatively straightforward. Take for instance
the eects for political awareness. Holding all other variable at their sample mean, a
one-unit increase on the awareness scale increases the probability of an ordinary strategic
vote by almost 4%. Interestingly, being a major-party supporter as well as an increase in
the strength of partisanship decreases the likelihood of a hypothetical voter to split her
ticket non-strategically but increases the probability to cast a straight-ticket enormously.
The most interesting information that marginal eects are able to provide is a comparison
of the importance of certain predictors in terms of facilitating certain types of voting
behavior. Overall, all hypothesized eects are generally not huge if considered in isolation.
The exceptions are the motivational factors, which show the strongest impact on the way
voters cast their votes.
For a substantive more fruitful interpretation it is necessary to dene theoretically interest-
ing scenarios and predict possible outcomes. One way to assess the impact of a particular
independent variable is to compute the predicted change in probability - so-called \rst
dierences" - to cast either a straight ticket, a split ticket, an ordinary strategic vote or a
coalition vote if this independent variable changes from one value to the next. What would
happen if one changes a particular independent variable from its minimum to its maximum
in the sample? The dierence in predicted probabilities, the size of the \rst-dierences"
for certain types of voting behavior, is another way to assess the substantive impact of
various factors on casting a strategic vote or casting a straight-ticket or splitting the ticket
non-strategically. The following table 6.4 summarizes predictions of various theoretically
relevant scenarios.
The values in table 6.4 represent the change in predicted probability for three dierent out-
comes if one particular independent variable is changed from its minimum to its maximum
for respondents in the Western part of the country, while all other variables are set to their
mean value. The respective values for a hypothetical voter in East Germany are similar.
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Table 6.4: Simulated Predicted Probabilities of Relevant Scenarios.
Independent Variables Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err.
Expectation FDP (x2) -0.066 0.042
+
Expectation Greens (x3) -0.077 0.044
PID small parties (x4) 0.254 0.062
PID major parties (x5) ***
Strength of PID (x6) 0.227 0.034 *** ***
Political Awareness (x7) 0.039 0.015 ***
Name Recall (x8) ***
Combined Effect 0.227 0.034 0.394 0.104 0.233 0.125
 *** indicates a factor that is not significant although hypothesized.
All other hypothesized factors are significant at p<.05 (and + = p<.1).
Simulated Change in Predicted Probability:
Straight Ticket Ordinary Strategic Coalition Vote
if Independent Variable changes from Minimum its Maximum
I computed these \rst dierences" only for theoretically relevant scenarios, which have
been hypothesized to have an impact on casting a straight-ticket, an ordinary strategic
vote or a coalition vote.
First, I will discuss the substantive impact of factors facilitating to cast a straight-ticket.
Recall that, for the likelihood to vote a straight ticket, there was only one (motivational)
hypothesis formulated, namely hypothesis six about the motivation as an extreme partisan
to cast a straight-ticket. An average voter in West Germany - i.e. she has a mean value on
all remaining individual level characteristics - is 23% more likely to vote a straight ticket if
she is a strong partisan than if she is a non-partisan. Apparently, extremity of partisanship
has a very strong impact on casting a straight ticket. This nding is hardly surprising
because it helps to establish the idea that, all else equal, voters rely on partisanship and
the extremity thereof to cast a straight ticket. It seems that this is a reasonable baseline
against which systematic deviations can be judged in order to identify strategies in voters'
decision-making.
Second, several hypotheses address factors instrumental for casting a strategic candidate
vote. Identifying with either the FDP or the Greens alone makes a hypothetical voter in
the West 28.4% points more likely to cast an ordinary strategic vote, supporting the fourth
hypothesis about the motivation as a partisan of a small party. Moreover, there is evidence
for the Capability Hypothesis. An otherwise average voter is almost 4% points more likely
to cast an ordinary strategic vote if she is very political aware as opposed to a politically
total unaware voter. It takes some eort to realize the implication of this strategy and,
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presumably, the impact of the competitiveness of the district race. The name recognition
dummy to get at the idea of a \personal vote" has also signicant impact employing this
strategy. Note this measure not only measures personal voters but also all voters who
know at least the name of the district candidate they vote for.
Third, there are factors facilitating a coalition vote. In some ways, the relevant scenarios
replicate the null ndings from table 6.2. It is somewhat troublesome, however, that the
motivational factor of supporting one of the major parties, as suggested by hypothesis
ve, does not have a signicant impact on its own. Nevertheless, table 6.2 shows that
identifying with a major-party does facilitate a coalition vote as opposed to split the ticket
non-strategically.
In this statistical model the impact of various factors cannot be assessed independently
from the level of other independent variables. Typically voters have expectations about the
success of parties' as well as some motivation and are somewhat sophisticated. Thus, it is
also substantively interesting how well all the hypothesized factors operate conjointly. This
dynamic will be simulated below. In order to assess the combined eect, which is repre-
sented for each category in the last row of the table, I simulate the change in probability of
an otherwise average voter in the Western part of the country if all hypothesized motiva-
tional factors as well as political awareness change from their minimum to their maximum
value and the expectation scales, conversely, from their maximum to their minimum value
simultaneously. This simulates how much more likely it is that a strong, knowledgeable
major-party supporter, who is certain whether both small parties to get over the threshold,
will cast a coalition vote, as compared to an unaware voter without partisan identication
and unsure about the success of both small parties. The combined eect of all ve hypoth-
esized eects, unfortunately, does not show any impact. This suggests that not only the
imputation model is to blame because the other characteristics do not facilitate this kind of
behavior either. More research has to be done to determine rened hypotheses about the
functional form of how expectations about the success of small coalition partners provide
incentives to cast a coalition vote.
The combined eect of a simultaneous change in four characteristics on the probability to
cast an ordinary strategic vote is very large. A knowledgeable, strong small-party supporter
in a close contested district race, even if she does not know the name of the local candidate,
is almost 43% points more likely to cast an ordinary strategic vote than a unaware voter in
an uncompetitive district without partisan identication, but who at least knows the name
of the candidate she is voting for. Finally, for casting a straight ticket, I hypothesized only
one factor such that a combined eect is the same as the single eect.
In summary, with the exception of the Coalition Insurance Hypothesis, all hypotheses are
supported by the model results. The simulations of substantive interesting scenarios in
table 6.4 further draw a similar picture. Although not all the factors I hypothesized make
a signicant dierence on their own in terms of voter decision-making, the analysis of
theoretically relevant combined eects supports my theory except theCoalition Insurance
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Hypothesis. At least the fact that no small party supporter casts a coalition vote, and I
therefore had to constrain the respective coecient to zero is at least some indication that
the idea behind the coalition insurance strategy is not o-base. The evidence presented
here shows that electoral institutions provide certain incentives, particularly for thewasted-
vote strategy. But voters do respond quite dierently to these incentives. As the combined
eects above make plain, if voters are appropriately motivated to understand the implication
of electoral rules, and cognitively capable of doing so - in short, if they have a highproclivity
to vote strategically - they are in fact much more likely to cast a strategic vote.
The idea that voters respond dierently to institutional incentives is contrary to the \com-
mon wisdom" in the strategic voting literature but, nevertheless, well supported by the
data. This result brings to an end my analysis of strategic voting in mixed electoral sys-
tems. The next chapter summarizes and concludes the ndings of the previous chapters
and, particularly, will focus on the generalizability of the results.
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Conclusion
This work has attempted to refocus the discussion about strategic voting from its narrow
focus on single-member district systems. The literature on strategic voting agrees that
institutional incentives are the driving force that spurs strategic voting. That said, it
is somewhat surprising that this literature has not looked more closely at variations in
the main independent variable and studied the impact of a variety of the institutional
settings on the extent and nature of the strategic voting phenomenon. My focus on mixed
electoral systems allows me to assess the incentives provided by various electoral rules at
play simultaneously. Similar to a natural experiment, using mixed electoral systems oers
the opportunity to study inuences of electoral rules by holding individual factors constant:
The same voter, after all, cast two separate votes under dierent rules. There is the
single-member district tier, where only the candidate wins, namely the one who garners a
plurality of the votes. And there is the PR tier that gives many parties a chance to attract
voters, gain representation, and thereby present themselves as credible alternatives to the
major parties.
The results of this endeavor should by now be clear: Electoral institutions matter for
strategic voting. They provide incentives and thereby determine the degree to which
voters behave strategically. My rst contribution to the strategic voting literature is to
allow the electoral institutions to vary, thereby opening up the possibility to provide dierent
incentives to operate at the same time for the same voter. I oer a theory that particular
institutions not only determine thedegree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies
voters systematically employ to make their decision. Through this analysis, it became
manifestly clear that mixed electoral systems are indeed an ideal choice of an electoral
institution to demonstrate this variability. This is represented in gure 7.1 by the arrow
from \Electoral Institution" to \Strategic Voting".
My second contribution is to have conceptually introduced variation in the degree to which
people anticipate the impact of these institutions. Although electoral institutions provide
incentives to vote strategically, these incentives vary in their impact on voters' decision-
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making process. A voter's proclivity to vote strategically determines the degree to which
the incentives provided by various electoral institutions are systematically anticipated in a
voter's decision calculus. Since the proclivity to vote strategically varies across voters, their
impact on voter's decisions varies, too. In gure 7.1, this dynamic is represented by the
reciprocal arrows between \Electoral Institution" and \Voter". This work provides strong
empirical evidence on various levels of analysis supporting both contributions. Variations in
electoral institutions as well as voter characteristics determine the decision-making process.
Figure 7.1: Explanation of Strategic Voting: A Schema
Electoral Institution
Strategic Voting
Voter
Strategic voting has two facets in mixed electoral systems. These facets are dierent
because mixed electoral systems employ a two-ballot system, whereby the rst ballot is
counted dierently than the second ballot. In a single-member plurality system, the mech-
anism behind strategic voting is the Duvergerian logic to avoid wasting a vote on an
uncompetitive candidate. Strategic voters employ thewasted-vote strategy and cast what
I call an ordinary strategic vote. A PR system, however, oers another rationale for voting
strategically. The fundamental question here is, who will have a chance to gain a majority
of the seats to build a government? Ordinarily, systems with a PR tier have more than
just two parties in parliament, and leading up to an election it is not fully obvious to voters
whether one party will get enough votes to form a single-party majority. In order to be
most eective, therefore, strategic voters consider several viable coalitions of parties and
try to support their most preferred coalition if the party they otherwise like most has no
chance of gaining a majority of seats in parliament. Strategic voters employ acoalition
insurance strategy and cast what I call a strategic coalition vote. The prior two chapters
90 Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistik und Wissenschaft, Bd. 2/2004
Conclusion
lend strong evidence at the district level, as well as the individual level, for these types of
strategies to operate in a particular mixed electoral system.
At the district level, the empirical analysis in chapter 5 reveals that strategic voting occurs
systematically across electoral districts. Furthermore, supported by verication with in-
dependent data sources, the district-level analysis claries to what extent strategic voting
actually occurs. In contrast to plurality systems, strategic voting in mixed electoral systems
is politically very inuential because it determines the fate of certain viable coalitions.
At the individual level, the empirical analysis in chapter 6 nds evidence that people vary in
their proclivity to vote strategically, as determined by various motivational factors as well
as their capability to comprehend the strategic implications that are oered by particular
electoral rules. In contrast to the conventional wisdom of the ticket-splitting literature, this
analysis reveals that ticket-splitters dier on several characteristics and should, therefore,
not simply be collapsed into a single residual category as is typically done in this literature.
Adding my theory to this literature makes it possible - and indeed, preferable - to disentangle
this residual category of voters in order to extract more information. This was accomplished
by employing an appropriate choice-model.
In summary, all four research questions posed in the introduction have been duly answered.
I have identied (Question 1) and quantied (Question 2) two strategies that are system-
atically used in electoral systems. Furthermore, I have distinguished strategic voters from
non-strategic ticket-splitters (Question 3) both conceptually and empirically, and deter-
mined the political implications of strategic voting in a particular mixed electoral system
(Question 4).
Methodologically, this is the rst application of ecological inference to the study of strategic
voting. King's EI undoubtedly oers new opportunities for this eld. In this vein, my
main methodological contributions reveal that critics are mistaken in attributing the lack
of robustness of EI estimates to the particular model or the estimation method itself.
Rather, the analysis in chapter 4 shows that EI can be successfully applied to the study of
multiparty systems (or to data with multiple categories in general). It seems that the lack
of robustness of EI estimates is a function of the data at hand, rather than the estimation
method.
An obvious direction for future research is to provide empirical evidence for these elec-
toral strategies across several countries. Both strategies should be observable in other
mixed electoral systems as well. Parliamentary systems most similar to the German system
studied here are those of New Zealand, Italy, Venezuela, Bolivia and the new electoral
system in Wales. At the individual level, the proclivity to vote strategically theoretically
does not depend on particular electoral rules. It should be possible to make comparisons
across countries as well. At the district level, it would be interesting to examine common
characteristics of districts in which people vote strategically in disproportionate numbers.
Aspects of political geography and spatial analysis (Anselin, 1988) might factor into any
potential variance in this regard.
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Moreover, the coalition insurance strategy should also apply to all PR systems in general.
Thus, there is a variety of countries to choose from that might be systematically studied
together. In this regard, however, the devil is in the details. As the term already implies,
whether voters employ this strategy, how frequently they do so, and what the political
consequences of this kind of strategic behavior are, are always to some degree conditional
on the nature of a party system. Diverse part systems oer the possibility of various
viable coalitions. What coalitions of parties are viable? And can voters identify these
coalition options consistently, such that a systematic deviation from sincere behavior can
be observed?
It is more likely to nd evidence for the coalition insurance strategy throughout dierent
electoral systems if voters have similar expectations about the viability of several coalitions.
The presence of at least three characteristics should facilitate this: rst, when number of
possible coalition partners is small, similar to Riker's \minimum winning coalition" notion
(Riker, 1962); second, when coalitions already exist, such that even inattentive voters
could follow what I have terms an electoral history heuristic to form an expectation about
the viability of several coalitions; and third, when the probably coalition options consist
of partners that are ideologically not too far apart from one another. Given a particular
structured party system, the more prevalent the coalition insurance strategy is, the more
voters should behave strategically and cast a coalition vote. Thus, there are many ways to
rene these ideas, not only across several elections but also across several countries with
slightly dierent electoral institutions.
Studies of mixed electoral studies can also inform the literature on strategic voting in
plurality systems. The mechanism behind the wasted-vote strategy might vary across
countries as well. For instance, compared to plurality systems, Duverger's \psychological
eect" (Duverger, 1954) operates a bit dierently in Germany. According to the pure
doctrine as well as the Cox model (Cox, 1994, 1997) one would expect that the Duvergerian
logic favors two-candidate competition on the district level. The empirical evidence of
actual district level results, however, speaks a slightly dierent language. Even minor-party
candidates get a considerable number of candidate votes. Why does this happen?
Germany's two-ballot system, and I suspect so-called \correction systems" (Massicotte
and Blais, 1999, p. 353) - in which the distribution of PR seats tries to correct the
distortions created by the plurality rule on the candidate vote - generally undermines the
classical Duvergerian logic. This might be an example of the interaction between dierent
rules in mixed electoral systems, so-called \contamination eects" that are now more
systematically discussed in the electoral systems literature (Herron and Nishikawa, 2001).
There is probably less strategic voting in a mixed electoral system than one would otherwise
expect if plurality and PR tiers are considered independently of one another. The \con-
tamination" of the strategic voting logic in mixed electoral systems, particularly prevalent
in \correction systems" such as that of Germany, stems from the interaction of dierent
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rules for candidate and list votes. First, apart from the surplus seat calculus1, which is too
esoteric to be considered by voters, there is little incentive to avoid wasting the vote. If
the candidate vote is considered not to be very important, why does a voter not express
loyalty to her party, rather than employing thewasted-vote strategy? In fact, Jesse (1988)
argues that voters, at least a majority of them, are indeed innocent of any strategic calculus
concerning the district race. Second, voters might feel a moral obligation (Meehl, 1977)
to turn out, and if this obligation is fullled, a vote is an end in itself. It is never wasted.
Third, since the list vote is more important, the ballot encourages straight-ticket voting by
having the party label next to the party name of the rst ballot, and thereby discourages
ticket-splitting and hence strategic voting. Fourth, cognitively speaking, straight tickets
are least burdensome (in terms of required eort), since voters can follow thepartisan label
heuristic. They need only know which party they are going to vote for and then cast a vote
for the local party candidate of their preferred party.
Given the tendency of voters to simply cast a straight ticket in mixed electoral systems,
it might be especially in the interest of small parties to eld a candidate in every district
although their candidates are not competitive, thereby undermining the Duvergerian \psy-
chological eect". This is, of course, quite a logistic endeavor for small parties. It might
pay o, though, in terms of giving voters the opportunity to cast a straight ticket. This
implies that small parties would gain more list votes than they would otherwise.
Since it seemed obvious that Ralph Nader, the Green Party candidate in the 2000 U.S.
Presidential race could not be elected President, presumably, only his staunchest supporters
ended-up voting for him. This was probably the rst time that strategic voters could have
made a dierence in a plurality system, like the U.S. If the main arguments of this study
are true then strategic voters are much more inuential to the outcome of an election in
mixed electoral systems.
1) Recall that a party is allowed to keep all seats won in district races in a state even if the proportion
of list-vote shares would indicate a lower number of seats. For instance, if the CDU wins all district
races in a state like Saxony, because of FDP supporters who cast ordinary strategic votes for the CDU
candidate in the district, they automatically get half of the seats in theBundestag for the state Saxony.
However, since these voters cast their list vote for the FDP and some CDU supporters likewise cast
a coalition vote in favor of the FDP, the CDU itself will end up with less than 50% of the list-vote
shares. According to pure proportional representation, the CDU should, therefore, get less than half
of the seats for Saxony. The CDU, however, is entitled to keep all their won district seats by the
candidate votes because of the surplus seat rule. Thus, if the strategic coordination among voters
for one coalition works, strategic ticket-splitting can produce surplus seats, thereby undermining the
principle of proportional representation and favoring the major parties in a particular coalition (Kaase,
1984). The same reasoning applies to the SPD and the Greens, respectively.
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